CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, MID 2004 – SEPTEMBER 2005
2004
§
26 August 2004, Rafik Hariri meets
in Damascus with Syrian President Bashar Assad to discuss the extension of the
term of President Lahoud.
§ 2 September 2004, the United Nations
Security Council adopts resolution 1559 concerning the situation in the Middle
East, calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.
§ 3 September 2004, the Rafik Hariri
bloc approves the extension law for President Lahoud.
§ 3 September 2004, the Lebanese
parliament adopts the extension law for President Lahoud and forwards it to the
Lebanese government for execution.
§ 7 September 2004, Economy Minister
Marwan Hamadeh, Culture Minister Ghazi Aridi, Minister of Refugee Affairs
Abdullah Farhat and Environment Minister Fares Boueiz, resigned from the
cabinet in protest at the constitutional amendment.
§ 9 September 2004, Prime Minister
Rafik Hariri indicates to journalists that he will resign.
§ 1 October 2004, Assassination
attempt on Marwan Hamadeh, in Beirut, Lebanon.
§ 4 October 2004, Rafik Hariri resigns
as prime minister.
§ 11 October 2004, Syrian President
Bashar Assad delivers a speech condemning his critics within Lebanon and the
United Nations.
§ 19 October 2004, United Nations
Security Council expresses concern that resolution 1559 has not been
implemented.
§ 20 October 2004, President Lahoud
accepts Hariri’s resignation and names Omar Karame to form the new government.
2005
§ 14 February 2005, Rafik Hariri and
22 other individuals are killed in a massive blast in a seafront area of
central Beirut.
§ 25 February 2005, the United Nations
Fact-Finding Mission arrives in Lebanon.
§ 8 March 2005,
Hezbollah organizes a one million strong “pro-Syrian” march.
§ 14 March
2005, a Christian/Sunni-led counter demonstration demands the withdrawal of
Syrian troops and the arrest of the chief of the security and intelligence
services.
§ 19 March 2005, a bomb explodes in
Jdeideh, a northern suburb of Beirut, wounding 11 people.
§ 23 March 2005, three people are
killed and three others wounded in an explosion in the Kaslik shopping centre,
north of Beirut.
§ 25 March 2005, the United Nations Fact-Finding
Mission issues its report in New York.
§ 26 March 2005, a suitcase bomb
explodes in an industrial zone in northeast Beirut, injuring six.
§ 1 April 2005, nine people are
injured in an underground garage in an empty commercial and residential building
in Broumana.
§ 7 April 2005, the Security Council
forms the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission
into the assassination of Rafik Hariri and 22 others on 14 February 2005.
§ 19 April 2005, Lebanon's Prime
Minister Najib Mikati announces that parliamentary elections will be held on 30
May 2005.
§ 22 April 2005, General Jamil
Al-Sayyed, head of the Internal Security Forces and General Ali Al-Hajj, head of the Sûreté Générale, decide to put their
functions at the disposal of Prime Minister Najib al Makati.
§ 26 April 2005, the last Syrian
troops leave Lebanon ending a 29 year military presence.
§ 26 April 2005, the United Nations
Verification Mission starts its mission to verify the complete withdrawal of
Syrian military and intelligence agents from Lebanon and its full compliance
with the resolution 1559.
§ 6 May 2005, a bomb explodes in
Jounieh north of Beirut injuring 29 people.
§ 7 May 2005, Parliament convenes to
adopt the proposed changes to the electoral law of 2000.
§ 30 May 2005, the first round of the
elections was held. The Rafik Hariri Martyr List, a coalition of Saad Hariri's
Future Movement, the Progressive Socialist Party and the Qornet Shehwan
Gathering, won the majority of the seats in Parliament.
§ 2 June 2005, journalist Samir Kassir
is killed when his car explodes in east Beirut.
§ 21 June 2005, former Lebanese
Communist Party leader George Hawi is killed when his car explodes close to his
home in Wata Musaytbeh.
§ 30 June 2005, Fouad Siniora, former
finance minister under Rafik Hariri, forms the new government composed of 23
ministers.
§ 12 July 2005, Defence Minister Elias
Murr is wounded and two other people are killed in a car bomb attack in Beirut.
§ 22 July 2005, at least three people
are wounded near rue Monot when a bomb explodes in the Ashrafieh quarter.
§ 22 August 2005, three persons are
injured in an explosion in a garage near the Promenade HotelHotel
in the Al-Zalqa area north of Beirut.
§ 16 September 2005, one person is
killed and ten others wounded by a bomb near a bank in Ashrafieh.
§ 19 September 2005, one person is
killed and two wounded in a small explosion at the Kuwaiti information office
in Beirut.
§ 25 September 2005, a car bomb
injures prominent news anchor, May Chidiac, in north Beirut.
I. PREFACE
1. The present report details progress made in the
implementation of Security Council resolution 1595. In that resolution, adopted
on 7 April 2005, the Security Council, condemning the 14 February 2005
terrorist attack in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed former Prime Minister Rafik
Hariri and twenty two others, reiterating its call for the strict respect of
Lebanon’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity, and
noting the conclusions reached by an earlier fact-finding mission (S/2005/203),
decided to establish an international independent investigation Commission
(hereafter called UNIIIC or the Commission) to assist the Lebanese authorities
in their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, in order to, among
other things, help identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and
accomplices.
2. Prior to the adoption of resolution 1595, the Security
Council had examined the report of the fact-finding mission to Lebanon on the
same subject, submitted on 24 March 2005. The report reflected the outcome of a
three-week enquiry, including a set of recommendations. The fact-finding mission was of the opinion
that, since the credibility of the Lebanese authorities conducting the
investigation was questioned, an international independent investigation should
be set up to establish the truth. For this purpose, a team with executive
authority needed to be created, covering all the fields of expertise needed for
such an investigation. Notwithstanding the limited time and manpower the fact
finding mission was granted, its conclusions and recommendations have been of
considerable value to the Commission.
3. In a letter dated 29 March 2005 (S/2005/208), the Government
of Lebanon expressed its approval of the Security Council’s decision to
establish an international commission of inquiry as well as its readiness to
cooperate with the commission within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty and
of its legal system.
4. Following the adoption of resolution 1595, intensive
consultations took place regarding the establishment of UNIIIC, its staffing
and its logistical support. On 26 May 2005, a small advance team headed by Commissioner
Detlev Mehlis arrived in Beirut. Mindful of the urgency of the matter, from a
temporary headquarters, the team endeavored to create the support platform for
its future work.
5. On 13 June 2005, after extensive discussions with the
Lebanese judicial authorities, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed
between the Government of Lebanon and the Commission. The MOU detailed the
modalities of cooperation between the two parties. Of particular importance to
the Commission was the agreement that “the Government of Lebanon shall
guarantee that the Commission is free from interference in the conduct of its
investigation, and is provided with all necessary assistance to fulfill its
mandate.” The Commission was to
determine its own procedures, collect evidence, both documentary and physical,
meet and interview any civilians or/and officials it deemed necessary and have
unrestricted access to all premises throughout the Lebanese territory, taking
into account Lebanese law and judicial procedures. The Lebanese authorities,
for their part, were to assist the Commission in its work by providing all
documentary and material evidence in their possession and by locating witnesses
as requested by the Commission.
6. On 16 June 2005, the Secretary -General
declared the Commission operational. On 17 June 2005, a press conference was
held by the Commissioner to solicit publicly the assistance of the Lebanese
authorities and to invite the Lebanese people to help the Commission by
relaying any information which might be of interest to the investigation. Two
hotlines were set up for this purpose, operated by the Lebanese authorities.
7. Shortly after the signing of the MOU, the Lebanese
authorities transmitted to the Commission an 8000 page case docket containing
all the information and evidence collected since 14 February 2005. Henceforth, the Commission conducted a
thorough criminal and judicial investigation
in close cooperation with the relevant Lebanese judicial (State General
Prosecutor of the Republic of Lebanon) and police (Internal Security Forces)
authorities, in order to avoid duplication, overlapping or contradictory
measures.
8. The Commission established close links with the Lebanese
security and judicial authorities. Regular discussions were held, particularly
with the judicial authorities, to exchange updated information and files, share
results and plan for the emerging phases of the investigation. Most of the witnesses interviewed by the
Commission were summoned through the Lebanese judicial and security
authorities. A case in point was the 30
August 2005 operation, in which Lebanese security forces and UNIIIC
investigators closely coordinated the house raid and search of former senior
security officials, prior to their transfer under close escort to the
Commission’s Main Operating Base (MOB)
for interviewing.
9. The Lebanese authorities were of great assistance in
establishing athe Main
Operating Base (MOB), as well
as a Forward Operating Base (FOB) for the work of the Commission. Lebanese security teams (police and
military) worked hand in hand with the Commission’s security team to ensure the
safety and security of the staff and premises.
10. Although resolution 1595 gave the Commission executive
authority, the Commission to a large extent was supported by the Lebanese
judicial and security authorities during search and raid operations. Moreover,
although the Commission was qualified to make proposals to the Lebanese
authorities regarding the arrest of persons allegedly involved in the
assassination, it remained the autonomous decision of the Lebanese authorities
to proceed with such actions.
11. From a two-track investigation, one Lebanese, one United
Nations, has emerged a complementary and unified investigation carried forward
in tandem by the Commission and the Lebanese authorities. The Lebanese
authorities have steadily shown the capacity to take increasing responsibility
in pursuing the case. This was demonstrated by the fact that they took the
initiative of arresting suspects, organizing raids and searches.
12. Given a deep mistrust that has prevailed among the Lebanese
people towards their security and judicial authorities, UNIIIC has become a
source of great expectation and hope for change, as well as an “interface” between
the Lebanese people and their authorities. The two press conferences,
particularly the first one, in addition to the interview of the first suspect,
and the arrest of the former senior security officials at the Commission’s
suggestion, had a catalytic effect. All of this was proof that in the eyes of
the Commission, no one was above the law. This boosted Lebanese confidence.
More witnesses came forward as the work of the Commission progressed. However,
a number of people insisted that their identity not be disclosed to the
Lebanese authorities.
13. There are other points worth highlighting. First, a number of witnesses were fearful
that they would be harmed if it were known publicly that they were cooperating
with the Commission. For this reason, the
Commission took great care to ensure that witness interviews were conducted in
a confidential manner. Because the
Commission credits the concern that these individuals have for their safety,
this report will not reveal the identity of those interviewed. Second, as is true in any investigation,
witnesses often provide information beyond the scope of the investigation being
conducted. The Commission has and will
continue to forward to Lebanese authorities all information related to any
criminal matter beyond the scope of the Commission’s investigation. Finally, the Commission interviewed people
whose agenda was to point the Commission not in the direction to where the
evidence would lead it, but in the direction the particular individual(s)
wanted the Commission to go. The
Commission dealt with these individuals and situations by remaining focused on
its single mission – to follow the evidence wherever it might lead and not to
follow the agenda of any particular person or entity.
14. Lebanese public opinion reflects a widespread view that, once
UNIIIC has delivered its report and closed down, Lebanon will be “left alone”.
A prevailing fear is that, in the aftermath of the completion of UNIIIC’s work,
and sooner rather than later, the Syrian security and intelligence services
will be back, orchestrating a “revenge campaign” in a society which remains
“infiltrated” by pro-Syrian elements. Recent bombings, assassinations, and
assassination attempts have been carried out with impunity; deliberate rumors
and prophetic media analyses have sustained this state of mind and have
deterred potential witnesses from contacting UNIIIC.
15. Notwithstanding fears and reluctance to volunteer information
as the Commission’s completion of its work seemed imminent (25 October), it is
fair to say that the Lebanese people in general terms have been eager to come
forward to help the Commission carry out its work.
16. The Commission could not operate in a media vacuum,
particularly in Lebanon. Certain Lebanese media had the unfortunate and
constant tendency to spread rumors, nurture speculation, offer information as
facts without prior checking and at times use materials obtained under dubious
circumstances, from sources that had been briefed by the Commission, thereby
creating distress and anxiety among the public at large and hindering the
Commission’s work when the focus should have been mostly on security issues.
It has been the Commission’s steadfast policy not to be drawn directly into a
dialogue in the Lebanese media, avoiding any escalation and staying above any
challenging or provocative statements. Both press conferences were aimed at
countering such speculation and clarifying the status of the investigation.
Inevitably, their effect was short-lived.
17. To enhance transparency and broader cooperation, working with
the judicial authorities entailed keeping the highest political authorities
abreast of developments in the investigation, to the extent that such action
did not call into question the independent nature of the Commission nor have a
direct impact on the course of the investigation per se. However, a number of
Lebanese political figures added to the climate of insecurity and suspicion, by
leaking information to the press, or by revealing sensitive data without the
prior consent of the Commission.
18. During the course of its investigation, the Commission had to
face major logistical challenges. In this regard, the extensive support and
assistance of sister organizations of the United Nations system and Interpol
were invaluable in the daily work of the Commission.
19. The international community, for its part, was always prompt,
when asked, in coming forward with expertise. This assistance greatly
facilitated the work of the Commission and gave added value to its work.
However, although resolution 1595 called on all States to provide the
Commission with any relevant information pertaining to the Hariri case, it is
to be regretted that no Member State did relayed
such
useable information to the
Commission. A number of contacts led to
mere exchanges of views and/or statements of facts. It is the Commission’s
reading of the resolution that the pertinent information envisaged by the
Security Council would have included among other things, intelligence
information that could have been submitted without any prior request from the
Commission.
20. Despite the human, technical and financial capacities
mobilized for the purpose of the investigation, and although considerable
progress has been made and significant results achieved in the time allotted,
the investigation of such a terrorist act with multi-faceted international
dimensions and their ramifications normally needs months (if not years) to be
completed so as to be able to establish firm ground for a potential trial of
any accused individuals. It is of the utmost importance to continue to pursue
the trail both within and outside Lebanon. The Commission’s work is only part
of a broader process. Even as this report is being written a significant arrest
has
occurredwas made just a few days ago; witness
interviews are continuing and complex evidence continues to be reviewed.
21. The Commission has established facts and identified suspects
on the basis of evidence gathered or available to it. The Commission has
checked and examined this evidence to the best of its knowledge. Until the
investigation is completed, all new leads and evidence are fully analyzed, and
an independent and impartial prosecution mechanism is set up, one cannot know
the complete story of what happened, how it happened and who is responsible for
the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the murder of 22 other innocent people.
Therefore, the presumption of innocence stands.
22. In producing this report the Commission has erred
on the side ofendeavored to ensureing
that nothing it does or says undermines the ongoing criminal investigation and
any trials that may follow. The Commission, at this juncture cannot disclose
all the detailed elements and facts it has in its possession, beyond sharing
them with the Lebanese authorities. The Commission has tried to set forth the
facts and to present the analysis of those facts in a way that most accurately
explains what happened, how it happened and who is responsible.
II. POLITICAL
BACKGROUND
23. Syria has long had a powerful influence in Lebanon. During the Ottoman Empire, the areas
that became Lebanon were was part of
an overall administrative territory governed from Damascus. When the countries were created established in
the aftermath of the First World War, Lebanon was created from what many Arab
nationalists considered to be rightfully part of Syria. Indeed, since the countries became
independent, they have never had formal diplomatic relations.
24. Syrian troops were invited into Lebanon by Lebanese President
Suleiman Franjieh in May 1976 in the early stages of the latter’s civil war. In
the Taif Agreement, reached among members of the Lebanese parliament, that
ended the civil war in 1989, inter alia,
Lebanon thanked Syria for its assistance in deploying its forces in the
Lebanon. A provision of the agreement
called for Lebanon and Syria to determine jointly the future redeployment of
those forces. A later agreement reached
between the two countries in May of 1991 regarding cooperation, restated that
provision. Syrian forces withdrew in
May 2005 in compliance with Security Council resolution 1559 (2004).
Relations between Mr. Hariri and Syria
25. The Commission’s investigation has confirmed what many in Lebanon
have long asserted, that senior Syrian intelligence officials had a powerful
day-to-day and overall strategic influence on the governance of Lebanon. The apparent growing conflict between Mr.
Hariri and senior Syrian officials, including Syrian President Bashar Assad,
was a central aspect of the information provided to the Commission through
interviews and documents. A meeting in
Damascus between Mr. Hariri and President Assad on 26 August 2004 appeared to bring
the conflict to a head. In that meeting,
which allegedly lasted for 10-15 minutes, President Assad informed Mr. Hariri,
who was then Prime Minister, that President Assad intended that Lebanon would
extend the term in office of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, which Mr.
Hariri opposed.
26. Lebanese and Syrian witnesses, and the transcript of a meeting
between Mr. Hariri and Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Walid Al-Moallem,
provided the Commission with sharply differing versions of what was said in
that meeting. A number of Lebanese
witnesses – including then former ministers Marwan Hamadeh and Ghazi Areedi,
Druze leader and head of the Progressive Socialist Party Walid Joumblat,
parliament member Bassem Sabaa, and Mr. Hariri’s son, Saad – reported that Mr.
Hariri told them that President Assad brusquely informed him of the decision to
extend President Lahoud’s term and threatened to “break Lebanon over your [Mr.
Hariri’s] head and Walid Joumblat’s” if Mr. Mr. Hariri
(and presumably Mr. Mr. Joumblatt)
did not agree to support the extension of President Lahoud’s term. Syrian officials characterized the meeting
differently. Syrian Foreign Minister
Farouk Sharaa and Rustum GhazaliGeneral Ghazali , head of Syrian
intelligence in Lebanon, described the meeting in positive terms. Mr.
General Ghazali told the Commission that Mr. Hariri told him that
President Assad referred to Mr. Hariri as a “friend,” and described a cordial,
respectful meeting in which President Assad consulted Mr. Hariri on the matter.
27. Following are excerpts of interviews conducted by the
Commission regarding the 26 August 2005 meeting, relevant parts of a letter to
the Commission from Mr. Sharaa, and a portion of the transcript of a taped
conversation between Mr. Hariri and Mr. Al-Moallem:
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic,
letter to the Commission of 17 August
2005:
“A meeting took place
between President Bashar Assad and late Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri in
Damascus on August 26th, 2004 within the framework of the ongoing
political consultation between the Syrian and Lebanese leaders. (…) A general
review was made of the local and regional developments, including the possible
extension of the mandate of Emile Lahoud, the President of Lebanon, in view of
the troubled regional conditions and based on the mutual interest in
maintaining stability in Lebanon. Mr. Al-Hariri requested that in case a
consensus regarding the mandate extension is reached in the Council of
Ministers, Syria should make endeavors to get President Lahoud to better
cooperate in the
forthcoming period. The President requested Mr. Al-Hariri
to consult with his group and with whom he deems suitable and to take the
appropriate position.”
Rustum Al Ghazali, undated written statement,
submitted to the Commission by letter of 17 August 2005:
“I had two meetings at
Anjar on that date (26 August 2004) with
Prime Minister Hariri. The first was in the morning of August 26th,
2004, on his way to Damascus to meet President Bashar Assad in Damascus, and
the second was on his return trip from Damascus to Beirut after meeting with
President Bashar Assad in Damascus. The latter meeting was also held in our
office at Anjar.”
(…)
“We discussed his
meeting with President Bashar Assad. He (Hariri) looked relaxed. Prime Minister
Hariri said that his meeting with President Bashar Assad was cordial and brief.
According to Prime Minister Hariri, President Assad told him: Abu Bahaa, we in
Syria have always been dealing with you as a friend and as the Prime Minister
of Lebanon. Today, I am also dealing with you as a friend and as the Prime
Minister of Lebanon. Under the difficult circumstances currently witnessed by
this region, with Lebanon in the midst, we are of the view that it is in the
interest of Lebanon to maintain the continuity of the regime by extending the
term of office of President Lahoud. As a friend, we would like you to clarify
your position regarding this matter. We are in no hurry to know the answer, and
you may wish to think about it at your convenience.”
Marwan Hamadeh, witness statement of 27 June 2005:
“On Wednesday 24 or 25
August, Mr. Hariri, Mr. Jumblat and Mr. Berri were all invited to go to
Damascus in order to be informed about the decision to extend Mr. Lahoud’s
mandate. Mr. Jumblat informed R. Ghazali that he would need to discuss it with
President Assad. R. Ghazali insisted that the answer should be “yes” before
setting up any appointment. He actually advised Mr. Jumblat to respond
positively because this was a strategic matter for President Assad. Mr.
Jumblat’s answer was negative. One hour later, Mr. Jumblat called me and told
me that the Syrian Intelligence had cancelled his appointment.
In the evening, Mr.
Jumblat and myself went to visit Mr. Hariri. He said that R. Ghazali insisted
that as long as his answer was not positive, he would not confirm his
appointment either. He was asked to go to Damascus, stay in his house (…) until
further notice. The following day, he was called in for a short meeting.”
(…)
“The day Mr. Hariri
met with President Assad, I was meeting at Mr. Jumblat’s residence in Beirut,
with Bassem Sabaa and Ghazi Areedi. We saw that Mr. Hariri’s motorcade was back
by 1 PM which meant that the meeting in Damascus was pretty short. We saw Mr.
Hariri woho looked tired. He was sweating. He
told the four of us that President Lahoud was to be reelected or “he will have
to pay a high price”. (…)He reported President Assad saying to him: ÏI
will break Lebanon on your head and Jumblat’s head.”
Ghazi Areedi, witness statement of 1 July 2005:
“Mr. Hariri reported
to us that President Assad told him: “If Jacques Chirac puts me out of Lebanon,
I will consider different oOptions and will
let you know. Either you are with us or against us. My choice is Emile Lahoud
for President. I will make sure he is the President. I will wait for your
answer. (…) Tell Walid Joumblatt that if he
has Druze people in Lebanon, I also have a Druze community in Syria. I am ready
to do anything.”
Walid Joumblatt, witness statement of 28 June 2005:
“According to Mr.
Hariri, Assad told him:”Lahoud is me. I want to renew his mandate. (…) If
Chirac wants me out of Lebanon, I will break Lebanon. (…) During his visit to
my house, Mr. Hariri was extremely tense and disappointed. He was in a very bad
position.”
Jubran Tueni, witness statement of 25 June 2005:
“Later on, in 2004,
when the issue of President Lahoud’s extension came up, Mr. Hariri also told
me, that President Assad had threatened him directly and told him, that voting
against the extension would be considered as being directed against Syria.
According to Mr. Hariri, President Assad added that in that case they, the
Syrians, would “blow him up” and any of his family members and that they would
find them anywhere in the world.”
Bassem Sabaa, witness statement of 30 June 2005:
“When Mr. Hariri came
back from his meeting with President Assad, I met him at Walid Jumblat’s
house.”
(…)
“He reported to us
President Assad’s words who has put it bluntly: “I am personally interested in
this matter. It is not about Emile Lahoud but about Bashar Assad”.
We asked him if he had
had a chance to discuss the matter with President Assad. He said that President
Assad told him that the matter was not open for discussion, that it was bound
to happen or else ÏI will break
Lebanon”(…). He was extremely aggravated. He told me that for the sake of
Lebanon and its interests, he must think about what he will do, that we are dealing
with a group of lunatics who could do anything.”
Saad Hariri, witness statement of 9 July 2005:
“I discussed with my
father, the late Rafik Hariri, the extension of President Lahoud’s term. He
told me that President Bashar Assad threatened him telling him: “This is what I
want. If you think that President Chirac and you are going to run Lebanon, you
are mistaken. It is not going to happen. President Lahoud is me. Whatever I
tell him, he follows suit. This extension is to happen or else I will break
Lebanon over your head and Walid Jumblat’s. (…) So, you either do as you are told or we will get you and your familiy
wherever you are.”
Rafik Hariri, taped conversation with Walid Al- Moallem
on 1 February 2005:
“In connection with
the extension episode, he (President Assad) sent for me and met me for 10 to 15 minutes.”
(…)
“He sent for me and
told me: “ You always say that you are with Syria. Now the time has come for
you to prove whether you meant what you said or otherwise.” (…) He did not ask
my opinion. He said: “I have decided.” He did not address me as Prime Minister
or as Rafik or anything of that kind. He just said: “I have decided.” I was
totally flustered, at a loss. That was the worst day of my life.”
(…)
“He did not tell me that
he wished to extend Lahoud’s mandate. All he said was “I have decided to do this, don’t answer me,
think and come back to me.””
(…)
“I was not treated as
a friend or an acquaintance. No. I was asked: “Are you with us or against us?”
That was it. When I finished my meeting with him, I swear to you, my body guard
looked at me and asked why I was pale-faced”
28. In the meeting with Mr. Al-Moallem, Mr. Hariri complained that
he believed that President Assad was being deliberately misinformed about
the actions of Mr. Hariri by the Syrian security services and Mr.
Sharaa about the actions of Mr. Hariri. Translated excerpts of the meeting include
the following statements by Mr. Hariri:
§ “I cannot
live under a security regime that is specialized in interfering with Hariri and
spreading disinformation about Rafik Hariri and writing reports to Bashar
Assad.”
§ “But Lebanon
will never be ruled from Syria. This
will no longer happen.”
29. During this discussion, Mr. Al-Moallem told Mr. Hariri that
“we and the [security] services here have put you into a corner.” He continued, “Please do not take things
lightly.”
30. The recorded interview clearly contradicts Mr. Al-Moallem’s
witness interview of 20 September 2005 in which he falsely described the 1
February meeting as “friendly and constructive” and avoided giving direct
answers to the questions put to him.
Syrian cooperation with the Commission
31. The information set forth above, and the evidence collected by
the Commission as described in the section below entitled Planning of the Assassination, point to the possibility that Syrian
officials were involved in the assassination of Mr. Hariri. When the Commission attempted to get the
cooperation of the Syrian Government in pursuing these lines of the investigation,
the Commission was met with cooperation in form, not substance.