I. PREFACE
1. The present report details progress made in the
implementation of Security Council resolution 1595. In that resolution, adopted
on 7 April 2005, the Security Council, condemning the 14 February 2005
terrorist attack in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed former Prime Minister Rafik
Hariri and twenty two others, reiterating its call for the strict respect of
Lebanon’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity, and
noting the conclusions reached by an earlier fact-finding mission (S/2005/203),
decided to establish an international independent investigation Commission
(hereafter called UNIIIC or the Commission) to assist the Lebanese authorities
in their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, in order to, among
other things, help identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and
accomplices.
2. Prior to the adoption of resolution 1595, the Security
Council had examined the report of the fact-finding mission to Lebanon on the
same subject, submitted on 24 March 2005. The report reflected the outcome of a
three-week enquiry, including a set of recommendations. The fact-finding mission was of the opinion
that, since the credibility of the Lebanese authorities conducting the
investigation was questioned, an international independent investigation should
be set up to establish the truth. For this purpose, a team with executive
authority needed to be created, covering all the fields of expertise needed for
such an investigation. Notwithstanding the limited time and manpower the fact
finding mission was granted, its conclusions and recommendations have been of
considerable value to the Commission.
3. In a letter dated 29 March 2005 (S/2005/208), the Government
of Lebanon expressed its approval of the Security Council’s decision to
establish an international commission of inquiry as well as its readiness to
cooperate with the commission within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty and
of its legal system.
4. Following the adoption of resolution 1595, intensive
consultations took place regarding the establishment of UNIIIC, its staffing
and its logistical support. On 26 May 2005, a small advance team headed by Commissioner
Detlev Mehlis arrived in Beirut. Mindful of the urgency of the matter, from a
temporary headquarters, the team endeavored to create the support platform for
its future work.
5. On 13 June 2005, after extensive discussions with the
Lebanese judicial authorities, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed
between the Government of Lebanon and the Commission. The MOU detailed the
modalities of cooperation between the two parties. Of particular importance to
the Commission was the agreement that “the Government of Lebanon shall
guarantee that the Commission is free from interference in the conduct of its
investigation, and is provided with all necessary assistance to fulfill its
mandate.” The Commission was to
determine its own procedures, collect evidence, both documentary and physical,
meet and interview any civilians or/and officials it deemed necessary and have
unrestricted access to all premises throughout the Lebanese territory, taking
into account Lebanese law and judicial procedures. The Lebanese authorities,
for their part, were to assist the Commission in its work by providing all
documentary and material evidence in their possession and by locating witnesses
as requested by the Commission.
6. On 16 June 2005, the Secretary -General
declared the Commission operational. On 17 June 2005, a press conference was
held by the Commissioner to solicit publicly the assistance of the Lebanese
authorities and to invite the Lebanese people to help the Commission by
relaying any information which might be of interest to the investigation. Two
hotlines were set up for this purpose, operated by the Lebanese authorities.
7. Shortly after the signing of the MOU, the Lebanese
authorities transmitted to the Commission an 8000 page case docket containing
all the information and evidence collected since 14 February 2005. Henceforth, the Commission conducted a
thorough criminal and judicial investigation
in close cooperation with the relevant Lebanese judicial (State General
Prosecutor of the Republic of Lebanon) and police (Internal Security Forces)
authorities, in order to avoid duplication, overlapping or contradictory
measures.
8. The Commission established close links with the Lebanese
security and judicial authorities. Regular discussions were held, particularly
with the judicial authorities, to exchange updated information and files, share
results and plan for the emerging phases of the investigation. Most of the witnesses interviewed by the
Commission were summoned through the Lebanese judicial and security
authorities. A case in point was the 30
August 2005 operation, in which Lebanese security forces and UNIIIC
investigators closely coordinated the house raid and search of former senior
security officials, prior to their transfer under close escort to the
Commission’s Main Operating Base (MOB)
for interviewing.
9. The Lebanese authorities were of great assistance in
establishing athe Main
Operating Base (MOB), as well
as a Forward Operating Base (FOB) for the work of the Commission. Lebanese security teams (police and
military) worked hand in hand with the Commission’s security team to ensure the
safety and security of the staff and premises.
10. Although resolution 1595 gave the Commission executive
authority, the Commission to a large extent was supported by the Lebanese
judicial and security authorities during search and raid operations. Moreover,
although the Commission was qualified to make proposals to the Lebanese
authorities regarding the arrest of persons allegedly involved in the
assassination, it remained the autonomous decision of the Lebanese authorities
to proceed with such actions.
11. From a two-track investigation, one Lebanese, one United
Nations, has emerged a complementary and unified investigation carried forward
in tandem by the Commission and the Lebanese authorities. The Lebanese
authorities have steadily shown the capacity to take increasing responsibility
in pursuing the case. This was demonstrated by the fact that they took the
initiative of arresting suspects, organizing raids and searches.
12. Given a deep mistrust that has prevailed among the Lebanese
people towards their security and judicial authorities, UNIIIC has become a
source of great expectation and hope for change, as well as an “interface” between
the Lebanese people and their authorities. The two press conferences,
particularly the first one, in addition to the interview of the first suspect,
and the arrest of the former senior security officials at the Commission’s
suggestion, had a catalytic effect. All of this was proof that in the eyes of
the Commission, no one was above the law. This boosted Lebanese confidence.
More witnesses came forward as the work of the Commission progressed. However,
a number of people insisted that their identity not be disclosed to the
Lebanese authorities.
13. There are other points worth highlighting. First, a number of witnesses were fearful
that they would be harmed if it were known publicly that they were cooperating
with the Commission. For this reason, the
Commission took great care to ensure that witness interviews were conducted in
a confidential manner. Because the
Commission credits the concern that these individuals have for their safety,
this report will not reveal the identity of those interviewed. Second, as is true in any investigation,
witnesses often provide information beyond the scope of the investigation being
conducted. The Commission has and will
continue to forward to Lebanese authorities all information related to any
criminal matter beyond the scope of the Commission’s investigation. Finally, the Commission interviewed people
whose agenda was to point the Commission not in the direction to where the
evidence would lead it, but in the direction the particular individual(s)
wanted the Commission to go. The
Commission dealt with these individuals and situations by remaining focused on
its single mission – to follow the evidence wherever it might lead and not to
follow the agenda of any particular person or entity.
14. Lebanese public opinion reflects a widespread view that, once
UNIIIC has delivered its report and closed down, Lebanon will be “left alone”.
A prevailing fear is that, in the aftermath of the completion of UNIIIC’s work,
and sooner rather than later, the Syrian security and intelligence services
will be back, orchestrating a “revenge campaign” in a society which remains
“infiltrated” by pro-Syrian elements. Recent bombings, assassinations, and
assassination attempts have been carried out with impunity; deliberate rumors
and prophetic media analyses have sustained this state of mind and have
deterred potential witnesses from contacting UNIIIC.
15. Notwithstanding fears and reluctance to volunteer information
as the Commission’s completion of its work seemed imminent (25 October), it is
fair to say that the Lebanese people in general terms have been eager to come
forward to help the Commission carry out its work.
16. The Commission could not operate in a media vacuum,
particularly in Lebanon. Certain Lebanese media had the unfortunate and
constant tendency to spread rumors, nurture speculation, offer information as
facts without prior checking and at times use materials obtained under dubious
circumstances, from sources that had been briefed by the Commission, thereby
creating distress and anxiety among the public at large and hindering the
Commission’s work when the focus should have been mostly on security issues.
It has been the Commission’s steadfast policy not to be drawn directly into a
dialogue in the Lebanese media, avoiding any escalation and staying above any
challenging or provocative statements. Both press conferences were aimed at
countering such speculation and clarifying the status of the investigation.
Inevitably, their effect was short-lived.
17. To enhance transparency and broader cooperation, working with
the judicial authorities entailed keeping the highest political authorities
abreast of developments in the investigation, to the extent that such action
did not call into question the independent nature of the Commission nor have a
direct impact on the course of the investigation per se. However, a number of
Lebanese political figures added to the climate of insecurity and suspicion, by
leaking information to the press, or by revealing sensitive data without the
prior consent of the Commission.
18. During the course of its investigation, the Commission had to
face major logistical challenges. In this regard, the extensive support and
assistance of sister organizations of the United Nations system and Interpol
were invaluable in the daily work of the Commission.
19. The international community, for its part, was always prompt,
when asked, in coming forward with expertise. This assistance greatly
facilitated the work of the Commission and gave added value to its work.
However, although resolution 1595 called on all States to provide the
Commission with any relevant information pertaining to the Hariri case, it is
to be regretted that no Member State did relayed
such
useable information to the
Commission. A number of contacts led to
mere exchanges of views and/or statements of facts. It is the Commission’s
reading of the resolution that the pertinent information envisaged by the
Security Council would have included among other things, intelligence
information that could have been submitted without any prior request from the
Commission.
20. Despite the human, technical and financial capacities
mobilized for the purpose of the investigation, and although considerable
progress has been made and significant results achieved in the time allotted,
the investigation of such a terrorist act with multi-faceted international
dimensions and their ramifications normally needs months (if not years) to be
completed so as to be able to establish firm ground for a potential trial of
any accused individuals. It is of the utmost importance to continue to pursue
the trail both within and outside Lebanon. The Commission’s work is only part
of a broader process. Even as this report is being written a significant arrest
has
occurredwas made just a few days ago; witness
interviews are continuing and complex evidence continues to be reviewed.
21. The Commission has established facts and identified suspects
on the basis of evidence gathered or available to it. The Commission has
checked and examined this evidence to the best of its knowledge. Until the
investigation is completed, all new leads and evidence are fully analyzed, and
an independent and impartial prosecution mechanism is set up, one cannot know
the complete story of what happened, how it happened and who is responsible for
the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the murder of 22 other innocent people.
Therefore, the presumption of innocence stands.
22. In producing this report the Commission has erred
on the side ofendeavored to ensureing
that nothing it does or says undermines the ongoing criminal investigation and
any trials that may follow. The Commission, at this juncture cannot disclose
all the detailed elements and facts it has in its possession, beyond sharing
them with the Lebanese authorities. The Commission has tried to set forth the
facts and to present the analysis of those facts in a way that most accurately
explains what happened, how it happened and who is responsible.
II. POLITICAL
BACKGROUND
23. Syria has long had a powerful influence in Lebanon. During the Ottoman Empire, the areas
that became Lebanon were was part of
an overall administrative territory governed from Damascus. When the countries were created established in
the aftermath of the First World War, Lebanon was created from what many Arab
nationalists considered to be rightfully part of Syria. Indeed, since the countries became
independent, they have never had formal diplomatic relations.
24. Syrian troops were invited into Lebanon by Lebanese President
Suleiman Franjieh in May 1976 in the early stages of the latter’s civil war. In
the Taif Agreement, reached among members of the Lebanese parliament, that
ended the civil war in 1989, inter alia,
Lebanon thanked Syria for its assistance in deploying its forces in the
Lebanon. A provision of the agreement
called for Lebanon and Syria to determine jointly the future redeployment of
those forces. A later agreement reached
between the two countries in May of 1991 regarding cooperation, restated that
provision. Syrian forces withdrew in
May 2005 in compliance with Security Council resolution 1559 (2004).
Relations between Mr. Hariri and Syria
25. The Commission’s investigation has confirmed what many in Lebanon
have long asserted, that senior Syrian intelligence officials had a powerful
day-to-day and overall strategic influence on the governance of Lebanon. The apparent growing conflict between Mr.
Hariri and senior Syrian officials, including Syrian President Bashar Assad,
was a central aspect of the information provided to the Commission through
interviews and documents. A meeting in
Damascus between Mr. Hariri and President Assad on 26 August 2004 appeared to bring
the conflict to a head. In that meeting,
which allegedly lasted for 10-15 minutes, President Assad informed Mr. Hariri,
who was then Prime Minister, that President Assad intended that Lebanon would
extend the term in office of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, which Mr.
Hariri opposed.
26. Lebanese and Syrian witnesses, and the transcript of a meeting
between Mr. Hariri and Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Walid Al-Moallem,
provided the Commission with sharply differing versions of what was said in
that meeting. A number of Lebanese
witnesses – including then former ministers Marwan Hamadeh and Ghazi Areedi,
Druze leader and head of the Progressive Socialist Party Walid Joumblat,
parliament member Bassem Sabaa, and Mr. Hariri’s son, Saad – reported that Mr.
Hariri told them that President Assad brusquely informed him of the decision to
extend President Lahoud’s term and threatened to “break Lebanon over your [Mr.
Hariri’s] head and Walid Joumblat’s” if Mr. Mr. Hariri
(and presumably Mr. Mr. Joumblatt)
did not agree to support the extension of President Lahoud’s term. Syrian officials characterized the meeting
differently. Syrian Foreign Minister
Farouk Sharaa and Rustum GhazaliGeneral Ghazali , head of Syrian
intelligence in Lebanon, described the meeting in positive terms. Mr.
General Ghazali told the Commission that Mr. Hariri told him that
President Assad referred to Mr. Hariri as a “friend,” and described a cordial,
respectful meeting in which President Assad consulted Mr. Hariri on the matter.
27. Following are excerpts of interviews conducted by the
Commission regarding the 26 August 2005 meeting, relevant parts of a letter to
the Commission from Mr. Sharaa, and a portion of the transcript of a taped
conversation between Mr. Hariri and Mr. Al-Moallem:
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic,
letter to the Commission of 17 August
2005:
“A meeting took place
between President Bashar Assad and late Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri in
Damascus on August 26th, 2004 within the framework of the ongoing
political consultation between the Syrian and Lebanese leaders. (…) A general
review was made of the local and regional developments, including the possible
extension of the mandate of Emile Lahoud, the President of Lebanon, in view of
the troubled regional conditions and based on the mutual interest in
maintaining stability in Lebanon. Mr. Al-Hariri requested that in case a
consensus regarding the mandate extension is reached in the Council of
Ministers, Syria should make endeavors to get President Lahoud to better
cooperate in the
forthcoming period. The President requested Mr. Al-Hariri
to consult with his group and with whom he deems suitable and to take the
appropriate position.”
Rustum Al Ghazali, undated written statement,
submitted to the Commission by letter of 17 August 2005:
“I had two meetings at
Anjar on that date (26 August 2004) with
Prime Minister Hariri. The first was in the morning of August 26th,
2004, on his way to Damascus to meet President Bashar Assad in Damascus, and
the second was on his return trip from Damascus to Beirut after meeting with
President Bashar Assad in Damascus. The latter meeting was also held in our
office at Anjar.”
(…)
“We discussed his
meeting with President Bashar Assad. He (Hariri) looked relaxed. Prime Minister
Hariri said that his meeting with President Bashar Assad was cordial and brief.
According to Prime Minister Hariri, President Assad told him: Abu Bahaa, we in
Syria have always been dealing with you as a friend and as the Prime Minister
of Lebanon. Today, I am also dealing with you as a friend and as the Prime
Minister of Lebanon. Under the difficult circumstances currently witnessed by
this region, with Lebanon in the midst, we are of the view that it is in the
interest of Lebanon to maintain the continuity of the regime by extending the
term of office of President Lahoud. As a friend, we would like you to clarify
your position regarding this matter. We are in no hurry to know the answer, and
you may wish to think about it at your convenience.”
Marwan Hamadeh, witness statement of 27 June 2005:
“On Wednesday 24 or 25
August, Mr. Hariri, Mr. Jumblat and Mr. Berri were all invited to go to
Damascus in order to be informed about the decision to extend Mr. Lahoud’s
mandate. Mr. Jumblat informed R. Ghazali that he would need to discuss it with
President Assad. R. Ghazali insisted that the answer should be “yes” before
setting up any appointment. He actually advised Mr. Jumblat to respond
positively because this was a strategic matter for President Assad. Mr.
Jumblat’s answer was negative. One hour later, Mr. Jumblat called me and told
me that the Syrian Intelligence had cancelled his appointment.
In the evening, Mr.
Jumblat and myself went to visit Mr. Hariri. He said that R. Ghazali insisted
that as long as his answer was not positive, he would not confirm his
appointment either. He was asked to go to Damascus, stay in his house (…) until
further notice. The following day, he was called in for a short meeting.”
(…)
“The day Mr. Hariri
met with President Assad, I was meeting at Mr. Jumblat’s residence in Beirut,
with Bassem Sabaa and Ghazi Areedi. We saw that Mr. Hariri’s motorcade was back
by 1 PM which meant that the meeting in Damascus was pretty short. We saw Mr.
Hariri woho looked tired. He was sweating. He
told the four of us that President Lahoud was to be reelected or “he will have
to pay a high price”. (…)He reported President Assad saying to him: ÏI
will break Lebanon on your head and Jumblat’s head.”
Ghazi Areedi, witness statement of 1 July 2005:
“Mr. Hariri reported
to us that President Assad told him: “If Jacques Chirac puts me out of Lebanon,
I will consider different oOptions and will
let you know. Either you are with us or against us. My choice is Emile Lahoud
for President. I will make sure he is the President. I will wait for your
answer. (…) Tell Walid Joumblatt that if he
has Druze people in Lebanon, I also have a Druze community in Syria. I am ready
to do anything.”
Walid Joumblatt, witness statement of 28 June 2005:
“According to Mr.
Hariri, Assad told him:”Lahoud is me. I want to renew his mandate. (…) If
Chirac wants me out of Lebanon, I will break Lebanon. (…) During his visit to
my house, Mr. Hariri was extremely tense and disappointed. He was in a very bad
position.”
Jubran Tueni, witness statement of 25 June 2005:
“Later on, in 2004,
when the issue of President Lahoud’s extension came up, Mr. Hariri also told
me, that President Assad had threatened him directly and told him, that voting
against the extension would be considered as being directed against Syria.
According to Mr. Hariri, President Assad added that in that case they, the
Syrians, would “blow him up” and any of his family members and that they would
find them anywhere in the world.”
Bassem Sabaa, witness statement of 30 June 2005:
“When Mr. Hariri came
back from his meeting with President Assad, I met him at Walid Jumblat’s
house.”
(…)
“He reported to us
President Assad’s words who has put it bluntly: “I am personally interested in
this matter. It is not about Emile Lahoud but about Bashar Assad”.
We asked him if he had
had a chance to discuss the matter with President Assad. He said that President
Assad told him that the matter was not open for discussion, that it was bound
to happen or else ÏI will break
Lebanon”(…). He was extremely aggravated. He told me that for the sake of
Lebanon and its interests, he must think about what he will do, that we are dealing
with a group of lunatics who could do anything.”
Saad Hariri, witness statement of 9 July 2005:
“I discussed with my
father, the late Rafik Hariri, the extension of President Lahoud’s term. He
told me that President Bashar Assad threatened him telling him: “This is what I
want. If you think that President Chirac and you are going to run Lebanon, you
are mistaken. It is not going to happen. President Lahoud is me. Whatever I
tell him, he follows suit. This extension is to happen or else I will break
Lebanon over your head and Walid Jumblat’s. (…) So, you either do as you are told or we will get you and your familiy
wherever you are.”
Rafik Hariri, taped conversation with Walid Al- Moallem
on 1 February 2005:
“In connection with
the extension episode, he (President Assad) sent for me and met me for 10 to 15 minutes.”
(…)
“He sent for me and
told me: “ You always say that you are with Syria. Now the time has come for
you to prove whether you meant what you said or otherwise.” (…) He did not ask
my opinion. He said: “I have decided.” He did not address me as Prime Minister
or as Rafik or anything of that kind. He just said: “I have decided.” I was
totally flustered, at a loss. That was the worst day of my life.”
(…)
“He did not tell me that
he wished to extend Lahoud’s mandate. All he said was “I have decided to do this, don’t answer me,
think and come back to me.””
(…)
“I was not treated as
a friend or an acquaintance. No. I was asked: “Are you with us or against us?”
That was it. When I finished my meeting with him, I swear to you, my body guard
looked at me and asked why I was pale-faced”
28. In the meeting with Mr. Al-Moallem, Mr. Hariri complained that
he believed that President Assad was being deliberately misinformed about
the actions of Mr. Hariri by the Syrian security services and Mr.
Sharaa about the actions of Mr. Hariri. Translated excerpts of the meeting include
the following statements by Mr. Hariri:
§
“I cannot
live under a security regime that is specialized in interfering with Hariri and
spreading disinformation about Rafik Hariri and writing reports to Bashar
Assad.”
§ “But Lebanon
will never be ruled from Syria. This
will no longer happen.”
29. During this discussion, Mr. Al-Moallem told Mr. Hariri that
“we and the [security] services here have put you into a corner.” He continued, “Please do not take things
lightly.”
30. The recorded interview clearly contradicts Mr. Al-Moallem’s
witness interview of 20 September 2005 in which he falsely described the 1
February meeting as “friendly and constructive” and avoided giving direct
answers to the questions put to him.
Syrian cooperation with the Commission
31. The information set forth above, and the evidence collected by
the Commission as described in the section below entitled Planning of the Assassination, point to the possibility that Syrian
officials were involved in the assassination of Mr. Hariri. When the Commission attempted to get the
cooperation of the Syrian Government in pursuing these lines of the investigation,
the Commission was met with cooperation in form, not substance.
32. The initial contact
between the Commission and the Syrian authorities took place on 11 June 2005 when the Commissioner
sent a letter to the Syrian Foreign Minister, requesting a meeting with
representatives of the Syrian government.
Mr. Sharaa replied on 11 July, pledging the Syrian Government’s support
for the investigation in general terms.
On 19 July, the Commission
asked to interview several witnesses including the President of the Syrian Arab
Republic. On 26 August, at the request
of the Syrian government, a meeting took place between the Commissioner and a
representative of the Syrian Foreign Ministry, in Geneva, Switzerland. At that meeting, the Commissioner was given
a letter containing written statements of four witnesses. It was indicated that President Assad would
not be available for any interview. The
Commissioner repeated his request for direct witness interviews and was told
that the request was under consideration but that President Assad would not be
available to be interviewed.
33. On 30 August the Commission sent another request to the Syrian
Foreign Minister, requesting interviews of several additional witnesses and
suspects in Syria. The letter requested
the support of the Syrian government to search the premises of the
suspects. On 7 September Foreign
Minister Sharaa informed the Commission in writing that while the Commission’s evidence was based on false testimony,
his Government agreed that the persons listed in the Commission’s requests of
19 July and 30 August, except for President Assad, could be interviewed.
34. On 12 September details of the upcoming interviews were
discussed between the Commission and a representative of the Syrian Foreign
Ministry. The Commission expressed its wish that the interviews should be held
in a third country, neither Lebanon nor Syria, which was
refused. The Syrian authorities insisted that the
interviews take place in Syria with the participation of Syrian officials. The interviews took place between 20 and 23
September. Each interview was conducted
in the presence of the Legal Advisor to the Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry or
another representative of the Foreign Ministry,;
one interpreter,
two note takers, and at times, an additional person whose affiliation was not
identified. At the end of the interview process, it was apparent that the
interviewees had gaiven
uniform answers to questions. Many of
those answers were contradicted by the weight of evidence collected by the
UNIIIC from a variety of other sources. The Commission has not had the
opportunity to follow up on these interviews or pursue its investigation
regarding a possible Syrian involvement in the crime.
35. The Commission has concluded
that the Government of Syria’s lack of substantive cooperation with the
Commission has impeded the investigation and made
it difficult to follow leads established by the evidence collected from a
variety of sources. If the
investigation is to be completed, it is essential that the Government of Syria
fully cooperate with the investigating authorities, including by allowing for
interviews to be held outside Syria and for interviewees not to be accompanied
by Syrian officials.
III. THE
CRIME
36. On 14 February 2005 at
approximately 1250 hrs, the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri left
the Nejmeh squareSquare in
Beirut going back to the Kuraytem Palace. He traveled in a motorcade comprising
of 6 cars, together with his security detail and Member of Parliament, Bassel
Fleyhan.
37. When the motorcade passed the St. George hotelHotel
at Minae Al-Hosn Street a huge explosion occurred and resulted in the death of
Mr. Hariri and others.
38. Shortly after the blast, the Director of Al-Jazeera TV in
Beirut received a telephone call from a man who stated that the Nasra and Jihad
Group in Greater Syria claimed responsibility for the assassination of Mr.
Hariri. This message was broadcast
shortly thereafter.
IV. THE
LEBANESE INVESTIGATION
Initial Measures
39. To resolve a crime of this magnitude requires strong
management capacity, clear roles, coordination and access to sufficient
competency, manpower, equipment and means of assistance. The following brief
outline reviews measures undertaken by the Lebanese authorities in the period
from the execution of the crime until UNIIIC was established.
Investigative Judge
40. Primary Military Investigative Judge Rasheed Mezher was
responsible for the crime investigation during the period from 14 to 21
February 2005. On the latter date, a
decision was taken by the Lebanese Government that the crime was a terrorist
act targeting the Republic, which led to the case being transferred to a new
competent court of jurisdiction, the highest Criminal Court in Lebanon, the
Justice Council. A consequence of this decision was that a new investigative
judge was appointed to lead the investigation, Judge Mr. Michel
Abou Arraj, the representative of the Prosecutor General’s Office.
41. Judge Mezher arrived at the crime scene less than an hour
after the blast, accompanied by Judge Mr. Jean
Fahd from the Prosecutor General’s Office.
He has described the situation at the crime scene as a chaos. His first
decisions were to appoint the Assistant Chief of Beirut Police, Mr.
General Naji Mulaeb, as the person in charge of the scene and to
assign him the task of removing all
dead bodies and wounded people from the scene, extinguish fires and,
thereafter, to withdraw all people from
the scene and close it off (witness statement).
42. At 1700 hrs, Judge Mezher summoned a meeting with all the
involved bodies, both from the Internal Security Forces and the Military,
comprising in total 10 officers. During
the meeting Judge Mezher distributed tasks for the different bodies and gave
further directions for the course of the investigation (witness statement).
43. The representatives of from the
Internal Security Forces during the meeting were: General Aouar as the acting
Commander of the Judicial Police and Head of the Forensic Unit, General Mulaeb
as acting Commander of the Beirut Police Force, General Salah Eid as the
responsible person for the blast site and Lieutenant Colonel Fouad Othman in
the capacity of the Head of the Information Division (witness statement).
44. After the meeting, at approximately 1900 hrs, Judge Mezher
returned to the crime scene for a second time.
He was not satisfied with his observations at the crime scene, but hoped
it should be better the next day since responsibilities had been distributed at
the earlier meeting. The shortcomings consisted mainly of lack of equipment,
means of assistance and experience. In addition, there was a lack of
communication between the various bodies involved, the directions from the
Investigative Judge were not followed and he did not receive proper feed-back
concerning the progress in the investigation (witness statement).
45. During the period of his functions as Investigative Judge,
Judge Mezher summoned approximately 10 people to his office for interrogations,
comprising staff from the St. George hotelHotel,
Mr. Hariri’s close protection officers, the father and mother of Abu
Adass Mr. Abu Adass and some eyewitnesses.
He also, in consultation with Judge Jean Fahd, took the decision to
request assistance from Switzerland regarding a forensic expert team to assist
the Lebanese authorities in the investigation.
When Judge Mezher left the function of Investigative Judge, 21 February
2005, no sustainable results had been achieved in the investigation.
46. The file was handed over to the new Investigative Judge, JudgeMr.
Abou Arraj. MrJudge.
Abou
Arraj was Investigative Judge in for the
investigation from 22 February to 23 March 2005. He was appointed by First
Judge Tanios Khoury, at the Supreme Council, and the file was registered at Abou
Arraj’s office on 22 February 2005 (witness statement). His first opinions when reviewing the file,
were that the crime had been a terrorist attack that would require a long
period of time and extensive investigative measures to be undertaken, in
addition to the application of substantial resources. In his opinion, all the initial investigative measures had been
performed in a professional and accurate way.
He was surprised at the removal of the motorcade cars. He did not meet with Judge Mezher, but
telephoned him whenever clarifications were needed (witness statement).
47. During the period of JudgeMr.
Abou
Arraj’s tenure as the Investigative Judge, the following measures were
undertaken (compiled notes case file).
|
Date
|
Measures
|
Affected
persons
|
|
22 February
|
· Recording of the lawsuit
|
|
|
24 February
|
· Second Beirut Regional Detachment Record
· Inspection of St George’s
· A summary of all military writs
· Signing writs:
Surete GeneraleSûreté Générale ,
Internal Security Forces, State Security, Intelligence
|
|
|
25 February
|
· The writ of the of the Special Criminal
Investigation Section
· Investigations about the diggings in St George’s
area
· The writ of the Special Criminal Investigation
Section: Notifications.
|
· Tayssir Abu Adass and First Adjutant Maher Daouk
|
|
26 February
|
· Several reports were received among them: The
inspection report and the report about moving the cars to Helou Barracks +
interrogating the guards
|
|
|
28 February
|
· Interrogation
· Statements of witnesses
|
· Tayssir Abu Adass
· Maher Daouk, Hassan Mouhamed
Ajuz and Amer Khaled SheChahadeh
|
|
28 February
|
· Subpoenaing
· Forensic Evidence Department: Asking for the
assistance of foreign experts.
|
· Rashid Hammud (at the hospital), Mohamead
Queiny (former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s
bodyguards) and Tamer Lahib.
|
|
1 March
|
· Giving the Head of the Fact finding mission to
Lebanon FitzGerald the permission to look into the investigations.
|
|
|
2 March
|
· Interrogations of two witnesses
|
· Tamer Lahib and Mohamead
Queiny.
|
|
3 March
|
· The reports of Mitsubishi Company were received +
the catalogue of the Mitsubishi pick-ups + a list of the names of the parts
and pieces found at the explosion site + a map showing (unclear).
· Doctor Kawas report regarding the examination of
Abdel- Hameeid
Ghalayini cadaver.
· A report was received from the Army Intelligence
about interrogations.
· The report of Doctor Hussein Chahrour regarding the
examination of Abdel- Hameeid
Ghalayini cadaver.
|
· Hussam Ali Mohsen, Ahmad Ammoura and
Nabil Ghsoub (unclear) regarding there relations with suspect Ahmad Abu Adass
(Note: they were not arrested).
|
|
5 March
|
· Subpoenaing witnesses (the first three were to be
interrogated the 8th of March 2005. The others on the 9th
of March 2005.
|
· Engineer Makram Aouar, Hamad Mulaeb,
Hussam Ali Mohsen, Mahmoud Baydoun (officer in the Surete GeneraleSûreté Générale ),
Afifi Abdallah AEl- Hershi
(unclear), Ghassan Ben Jeddou
(Al-Jazeera Channel).
|
|
7 March
|
· Inspection of the contents of the cardboard boxes
(Dalal Dargham)
· Brigadier General Imad Kakour came and informed us
about the investigations and took a copy of the investigation report, Ziad
Ramadan was with him.
|
|
|
8 March
|
· We received: The DNA results and the maps of the
crime scene.
|
|
|
10 March
|
· The report of Al- Bourj
Squad regarding the search for Abdel Hameeid
Ghalayini cadaver.
|
|
|
11 March
|
· The discussion of Lieutenant General Ziad Nasr +
Captain Mitri El Namar.
· Convocation of Hussam Mohsen
· Convocation of the Palestinian Marwan Abdel- Wahhab
Kattan (unclear), 14/3/2005
|
|
|
14 March
|
· Urging the heads of the services not to remove
rubbles.
· Statements of witnesses.
· Letter of the international Mission regarding the
completion of its work.
|
· Jack Chalitta, Ali Amhaz and Marwan Koubtan.
|
48. On 23 March 2005, JudgeMr.
Abdou- Arraj
stepped down from the post of Investigative Judge. The reason for this was the
tense political atmosphere at this particular time: a lot of mistrust was being
directed towards the Lebanese judiciary and criticism being leveled at the manner of the investigation. In addition, while in charge of the Hariri
investigation, he also had to discharge his normal functions. The case was
contaminated with political issues and during demonstrations in Beirut on 14
March 2005, he heard people mentioning his name in a critical manner (witness statement).
49. At the time he left the post of Investigative Judge, the only
achievement in the investigation was the Abu Adass Mr.
Abu Adass lead, despite attempts to focus on the modus operandi of
the explosion and to get all experts involved to come up with one consensus
opinion (witness statement).
50. Judge Abou Arraj was replaced by Investigative
Judge Elias Eid, who as of October 2005, is still in charge of the
investigation.
Internal Security
Forces
51. On 14 February 2005, General Ali Al-Hajj was the Head of the
Internal Security Forces (ISF). He was
promoted to the post in November 2004, allegedly appointed by the Syrians, he
stepped down from the post during spring 2005 in the aftermath of the blast
that killed Mr. Hariri. According to
his statement, he was at his office when he was alerted about the blast. He
immediately went to the crime scene by car. During the ride he called General
Shahid Al-Khoury, Chief of the Services and Operations Division within ISF, who
told him that it was a huge blast. Mr.
General Al-Hajj then ordered Mr. Al-Khoury to send all
responsible units to the scene. The
units comprised the Forensic Unit under the command of General Hisham Aouar,
the Explosives Unit under the command of General Abdel-Badie Al-Soussi and the
Investigation Unit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Fouad Othman. This
was his only responsibility, to provide sufficient resources. After the arrival
of the Investigative Judge, all ISF staff werewas
under the command of the Judge and Mr.
General Ali Al-Hajj could not interfere in the investigation (witness
statement).
52. In his opinion, the problems at the scene were related to the
presence of too many different agencies, such as the Army, ISF, State Security
and Public Security.
53. Later that afternoon, Mr.
General Al-Hajj joined a meeting with the Higher Defence Council
at the Presidential Palace. The meeting was chaired by the President. Other
participants were the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Defence, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Economy,
the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Public works, the Governor of Beirut
and Commanders from the various security agencies. The meeting discussed the subject matter of the crime, its
referral to the Judicial Council, and the ramifications of the crime.
54. After the meeting Mr.
General Al-Hajj returned to his office: soon thereafter the
Al-Jazeera TV channel broadcast a videotape, where Ahmad Abu Adass claimed
responsibility for the blast and the killing of Mr. Hariri. From that time all
available ISF resources, except those occupied with the crime scene work, were
focused on the Abu Adass track.
Military Intelligence
55. On 14 February 2005, General Raymond Azar was the Head of
Military Intelligence. He was promoted to the post in December 1998 and stepped
down during spring 2005 in the aftermath of the blast that killed Mr. Hariri.
According to his statement, he was alerted about the blast by Colonel Mohamed
Fehmi, Head of the Military Security Branch.
He did not go to the crime scene, but followed the case in detail from
his office, together with Colonel Albert Karam, the Chief of Beirut
Intelligence Branch. He informed President Lahoud and GeneralRustum
Ghazali Ghazali about the blast at the time
of its occurrence (witness statement).
56. Personnel from Military Intelligence (mainly specialists in the
field of explosives) visited the crime scene and conducted their part of the
examination. They confirmed that the type of explosives used were TNT and the
estimated amount to be some 300 kilograms. All concrete evidence found on the
site was handed over later to the ISF (General Hisham Aouar) and to Mr.
General Azar’s knowledge there were some metal fragments and a
gun. His opinion was that basically ISF, but also the Prosecutor General’s
Office and the Investigative Judge, had the overall responsibility for the
crime investigation.
57. In the afternoon of 14 February 2005, Mr.
General Azar attended the meeting at the Higher Defence
Council. At the meeting, a presentation
was made about the assassination of Mr. Hariri, with all the details that were
available at that time. Each participant presented his own point of view.
58. At a later stage, his Directorate was assigned to focus on
three elements:
§ The videotape
of Ahmad Abu Adass
§ The cellular
communications that took place in the area of the explosion
§ The type and
amount of explosives used.
Sûreté Générale
59. On 14 February 2005, Brigadier General Jamil Al-Sayyed was the
Head of the Sûreté Générale. He was promoted to the post in December 1998 and
stepped down during spring 2005 in the aftermath of the blast that killed Mr.
Hariri. According to his statement, he was at his office when he heard the
blast, but thought that the noise was a result of Israeli air fighters passing
through the sound barrier. Somewhere between 1315 and 1330 hrs, Lieutenant
Colonel Ahmed Al-Assir informed him of the blast and that Mr. Hariri’s
motorcade had been the target. He stayed at his office and no one from the
Sûreté Générale was sent to the scene. He called the President, the Minister of
the Interior and Rustum GhazaliGeneral
Ghazali.
60. Later that afternoon, General Mr.
Al-Sayyed attended the meeting at the Higher Defence Council. The meeting was
focused on the consequences in the nearby future on
the ground. The suggestions were submitted to the Government, which had a
meeting later the same evening.
61. On Tuesday morning, 15 February 2005,
he got a phone call from a journalist from Al-Jazeera who told him nobody had yet
picked-up the Abu Adass videotape. The tape was brought to him 16 February 2005.
He made a copy and sent the original to the Investigative Judge Abou Arraj.
Crime Scene
Investigation
ISF Report
62. As with any similar criminal case, prompt examination of the
crime scene and its surroundings is of paramount importance for the outcome of
the investigation. The officer in charge of the crime scene, General Naji
Mulaeb of the ISF, arrived at the scene at 1305 hrs on 14 February 2005. He has issued a report dated 3 March 2005,
on the crime scene examination conducted by the Lebanese authorities (General
Directorate of Internal Security Forces, Beirut Police Unit, Ref. No.: 95)
stating the following:
“On
implementation of investigation order issued by the first investigating judge
of the military court in Beirut regarding the investigations and anything that
can throw light on the enquiry into the explosion which caused the death of
former Prime Minister Hariri and others.
Record: Investigation order issued by the first
investigating judge of the military court in Beirut No23/2005 dated 14 February
2005.
Order
from the General Department of Referrals No 207/1181 dated 15 February 2005.
On
14 February 2005 at about 1250 hours, an explosion took place in Beirut which
the operations room reported as being close to the St. George hotelHotel. All patrols were ordered to go to the
scene. I proceeded there and arrived
within a few minutes. Cars on both
sides of the road in the vicinity were ablaze and there was a lot of
smoke. Civil defense, fire brigade and
Red Cross vehicles hastened to the area and took action to put out the fire,
gather the corpses and take the wounded to hospital. The scene was chaotic, and security and military personnel were
mixed with civilians, firemen and first aid personnel and civilians, newspaper
journalists and the media were all eager to get to the scene. I ordered all the officers and police
officers and patrols to do everything necessary to maintain security corridors
and to take the requisite measures to safeguard the scene of the crime and keep
away onlookers and made the commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat
responsible for implementation.
The
preliminary indications are that the explosion took place in the motorcade of
Prime Minister Hariri but the outcome is not yet know.
Specialists
in gathering evidence and explosives experts began their work.
In
addition to political and security officers, there came to the scene a
Government commissioner from the Military Court with some support staff; and
Rasheeid Meazhaer,
the first investigating judge from the Military Court in Beirut, who orally
delegated me, in my capacity as officer in charge of the police during the
absence from 12 February 2005 of the Police Commander on a mission abroad, or
whoever I should see fit, to undertake the investigations and anything that
could throw light on that explosion and to duly inform him. The oral authorization would be followed up
in writing.
As
soon as the General Director of Internal Security arrived at the scene, I
informed him of all the above.
In
accordance with the above-mentioned oral delegation of authority, I ordered
Major Salah Eid to undertake the necessary investigative procedures in his
capacity as the commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat, within the
remit of which the explosion took place, and to keep me informed.
The
work of retrieving the corpses and taking the wounded to hospital continued, as
did the work of personnel from the Central Office of Accidents and the
explosive experts. A complete sweep was
made of the scene and the surroundings.
A team of engineers from the Lebanese Army came and took samples from
the scene in order to carry out tests thereupon. An army detachment carried out a search of the site and buildings
and assisted in imposing a security cordon.
In
view of the urgency of the investigation, we sent telegram No. 2065 dated 14
February 2005 to the leadership of the regional police unit and to police unit
commanders in which we asked that all the necessary investigations should be
carried out within the remit of each unit with respect to the corpses that had
been taken to the hospitals in each area, in order to permit their relatives to
identify them and duly inform me, thereby enabling me to gain the approval of
the relevant authorities for the return to their relatives of those
corpses. Depositions were to be taken
from the wounded and a copy deposited in the file of the overall investigation,
through the Al- Burj squad.
Further
to our telegram No. 2077 dated 14 February 2005, sent to unit departments
regarding the isolation of the scene of the crime and establishment of a
security cordon around it, we ordered the commander of the second Beirut
regional secretariat to use whatever personnel were necessary to perform those
tasks and to place metal barricades and yellow tape around the scene and, in
coordination with the commander of the traffic secretariat, to ensure the flow
of traffic.
Major
Eid kept me informed of the progress of the investigation and its outcome, and
I duly informed the first investigating judge from the Military Court. The corpses were handed over to their
relatives in accordance with legal principles.
On
the instructions of the first investigating judge of the Military Court, and
with the approval of the General Director of Internal Security Forces, the cars
from the Hariri motorcade were taken to the Helou barracks, once they had been
photographed in situ and a video recording had been made in the presence of the
commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat, the commander of the
second Beirut traffic squad, the commander of the Al-Burj
detachment and a squad of criminal investigators, and using the lights provided
by the civil defense, in accordance with report No. 144/302 dated 14 February
2005. They were deposited in the Emile
Helou barracks.
In
our telegram No. 2122 dated 15 February addressed to the commander of the
emergency services, we requested that they should be safeguarded and that
no-one should be allowed to touch them.
At
1500 hours on 15 February 2005, Major Omar Makkawi, the commander of the Beirut
police unit, reported and assumed his command.
He informed me of all the procedures that had been taken and all
incidents that had occurred, and we followed up the process of the
investigation being undertaken by Major Salah Eid. We then duly informed the first investigating judge of the
Military Court of the same.
Pursuant
to warrant No. 2F206/dated 17 February 2005, the unit commander transferred to
us the written delegation of authority issued by the first investigating judge
of the Military Court Ref 23/2005 dated
14 February 2005 concerning the explosion, which was transmitted to us for
implementation by the General Directorate as No. 2SH207/1181 dated 15 February
2005.
Similarly,
the unit command gave us, pursuant to warrant No. 206/1735 dated 18 February
2005, written authorization from that party Ref. 36/2005 dated 18 February
2005, which included an order to keep the cars from the Hariri motorcade inside
the barracks, cover them with tents and place them under guard, which was done.
In
accordance with warrant No. 2F206/1736 dated 18 February 2005, The first
investigating judge of the Military Court have us written authorization Ref.
36/2005 dated 18 February 2005, which included an order to contact the Governor
of Beirut, who should supply us with the names of those recently working at a
workshop at the site of the explosion. The aforementioned authority was
carried out by means of a document of 14 pages which is attached.
Pursuant
to the first delegation of authority referred to above; on the basis of the
order to the commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat to carry out
the investigation; and as a result of the first report, No. 302/143 dated 14
February 2005 and all the investigations arranged by the units in the police
unit and the regional police unit, we hereby submit the following:
Table
No. 1 has been prepared concerning the corpses that have been returned to their
relatives.
Table
No. 2 has been prepared concerning the persons injured by this explosion.
Table
No. 3 contains the depositions that were made concerning the explosion.
A
table has been prepared showing the measures that were taken: an examination of
the scene of the crime; articles impounded; damaged cars; the loss of one
person at the site of the explosion and the failure to find him.
All
those procedures have been verified in report No. 302/1 dated 14 February
2005”.
Swiss Forensic Report
63. The Lebanese experts involved in the crime scene examination,
representing a variety of different agencies, came up with different opinions
on the findings and results of the examination. As a result, they were summoned
to a meeting at the Military Court in the presence of the Prosecutor General (witness
statement). The meeting led to a request from the Lebanese authorities
for foreign assistance in examining the crime scene, which was directed to the
Government of Switzerland. A Swiss forensic expert team visited Lebanon in
March 2005 and conducted a forensic investigation. The team’s final report stated (excerpt):
“Our
conclusions about an explosion above or under ground are based upon the
following examinations:
§ Interpretations based on dispersion of fragments, size
and shape of fragments
§ Interpretations based on size and shape of crater
§ Ballistic interpretations
§ Interpretations of damages on buildings (structure,
glass)
After
interpretation and analysis of the dispersion of fragments, we can’t give clear
evidence whether there was an explosion above or under ground. Our analysis and research concerning the
shape and form of the crater also gives no clear evidence whether there was an
explosion above or under ground.
On
the other hand, the form and shape of the crater gives some information about
the possible amount of the charge (above or under ground):
§ As mentioned in our report it is expected that an
amount of about 1000 kg above ground will create a crater like the one on the
scene
(…)
Concerning
the fact that the charge was possibly placed in a car, it must have been of
larger size. If such a vehicle has been
used we expect some big fragments (e.g. from the frame) of the vehicle close to
the center of the explosion.
The
grade of damage of the metal fragments which were shown to us by the police
(said to be originated of a Mitsubishi Canter) is consistent with fragments we
would expect if such a vehicle was located in the center of the explosion.
(…)
After
having conducted all the analysis and discussions of the facts we have
collected, we came to the conclusion that it was most likely an explosion above
ground.
According
to this finding we estimate an amount of 1000kg of high explosive.
The
unconfirmed and preliminary results of the analysis of a soil sample of the
crater showed Trinitrotoleune (TNT) as explosive charge”.
Rifi Report
64. In March 2005, the present Head of the ISF, General Ashraf
Rifi, prepared a report on the initial measures undertaken by the competent
Lebanese authorities on the scene of the crime, which was submitted to the UN
Fact Finding Mission. The report concluded (excerpt):
“
II. Measures
taken:
The importance of this tragic
event that led to the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri had
an effect on all subsequent measures and actions taken.
A. Rescue
and evacuation operations and find of bodies:
In the immediate aftermath of
the explosion, security, military and civil defense organs as well as the Red
Cross rushed to the crime scene to perform their duties. In spite of all the measures taken, these
were, unfortunately, not up to the level that would save the face of these
organs. These measures were
flawed. Therefore, the Minister of
Interior and Municipalities issued a memorandum 137/(sad)2, dated 25 February
2005, instructing the General Inspectorate of the Internal Security Forces to
investigate the deeds and actions.
Based on the results, he suggested the dismissal of both the General,
Chief of Beirut Police and the General, Chief of the Judicial Police.
B. Preservation
of the crime scene:
Immediately after the
explosion happened, the military investigating judge was put in charge of the
investigation. Al the security and
judicial police personnel were put at his disposal. He gave rogatory commissions and stipulated the kind of measures
to be carried out, especially the preservation of the crime scene. However, the measures taken were below the
required level and contrary to the obvious fundamental basis upon which crimes
as serious as this one or even less serious crimes are investigated, in which
case, strict measures ought to be taken in order to prevent any tampering with
the crime scene or any clues that could be used as criminal evidence to help in
the investigation and uncover the truth.
This could have been carried out without neglecting the humanitarian
aspect of the tasks to be implemented, i.e. giving priority to finding the
victims and the injured, providing the latter with the first aid in order to
save them. Serious mistakes were
recorded in this regard:
a) There was a state of chaos in the crime scene not only
during the first few hours following the explosion, during which much focus is
on extinguishing the fire, saving the injured and looking for the missing, but
regrettably and unnecessarily for a much longer time.
b) There was no coordination between all the security
organs present on the crime scene.
c) Looking for the missing persons was done in an
irresponsible, unprofessional and careless way. Some were later found by accident or by their families. The following controversial elements were
recorded:
§ The body of Zahi Abu Rujaili, a Lebanese citizen, was
found on 15 March 2005. According to
the medical examiner, the victim had survived the explosion for approximately
12 hours.
§ The body of one of the victims was found by
coincidence 8 days after the explosion.
§ The body of Abdel-Hameed Ghalayeeeeni,
a Lebanese citizen, was found 16 days after the explosion by his family and not
the judicial or civil defense officers.
§ The fate of Farhan Ahmad Al-Issa is still unknown, he
is still missing. It is feared that
finding his body would constitute yet another scandal.
d) A few hours after the explosion took place, around
2300 hrs, major evidence was removed from the crime scene. The convoy cars of the late former Prime
Minister were transferred to Helou Barracks under the pretext of preserving
them although what was left of the cars did not justify their preservation
except for their value as criminal evidence because they were the target of the
explosion. This was not the only
instance bearing proof of the tampering with the crime scene. A BMW car that was not part of the convoy
was also removed whereas focus should have been on not removing any cars and
maintaining them the way they rested after the explosion in order to determine
how the crime was committed.
e) A bulldozer was introduced into the crime scene on the
day of the explosion, 14 February 2005, in the evening for no justifiable reason. As soon as the Minister of Interior and
Municipalities got knowledge of it, he gave orders to retrieve it and preserve
the crime scene as it was.
C. The
conduct of the investigation, its conditions and the determination of how the
crime was committed:
a) It is common knowledge that major mistakes were made
in the course of conducting the investigation, among which the leaking of
information that created confusion.
This in turn compromised the trustworthiness of the local
investigation.
(….)
III. Responsibilities
a)
Responsibility for a tragic crime such as the
one we are dealing with cannot be limited to one aspect. As mentioned above, it encompasses the
political, judicial and security aspects.
(….)
Decision to remove
motorcade vehicles
65. The decision to fill the crater at the crime scene, to remove
the motorcade vehicles and to re-open the street on the day after the blast, is
confusing, assuming that there was a collective will to perform a professional
crime scene examination in order to track down the perpetrators and bring them
to justice. The confusion, reflected in the variety of statements from the
officials most closely involved, speaks for itself.
Investigative Judge Mezher
66. At 2230 hrs on 14 February, Judge Mezher Mezher was
at his home, when he got a phone call from General Mr. Naji
Mulaeb, who informed the Judge that the representatives from the various
agencies at the crime scene had started collecting pieces of metal from the
motorcade vehicles in order to perform their own further forensic examinations.
There was nothing General Mulaeb could do to stop them.
He suggested that the motorcade vehicles be removed to a safe place and
proposed the Helou barracks in Beirut. Judge Mezher agreed to the proposal
under the following conditions. The vehicles should be filmed on the spot, they
should be marked and numbered: they should also be filmed during the
transportation and again upon arrival at the Helou barracks, where they should
be covered and guarded around the clock in order to avoid any tampering with
evidence. Judge Mezher had no
information about a decision to fill the crater and reopen the street (witness
statement). The vehicles were
moved from the crime scene during the night of 14 February.
General Jamil Al-Sayyed
67. On the morning of 15 February 2005, GeneralMr.
Al-Sayyed read in the newspaper about the removal of the motorcade
vehicles. At 0800 hrs, he called Mr.
General Ali Al-Hajj, the Head of the ISF and asked what was going
on. Mr.
General Al-Hajj replied that two teams were working on clearing
the road which would be reopened at 1000 hrs.
In response to a direct question, GeneralMr.
Al-Hajj stated that the orders came from Mustapha Hamdan, the Commander of the
Presidential Guard (witness statement).
General Ali Al-Hajj
68. On 14 February 2005 at 2230 hrs, Mr. Saddik received a
telephone call at his office, (where he was with General Hisham Aouar) from the
Director General of the Public Works Ministry, Mr. Fadiy
El-Nammar. Mr. El-Nammar told
him that a decision had been taken to re-open the road the next day and that his staff were
ready to start working at sunrise the next morning. The call was on the landline and was overheard by General El
Aouar. He claimed to be surprised about the telephone call because Mr. El-Nammar
had no jurisdiction in the matter. It
was publicly recognized that Fadiy
El-Nammar
was very close to the Republican Palace, which meant that he was taking his
orders from there. Mr.
El-Nammar Nammar alleged that he had cleared
the matter with the Investigative Judge.
He called the acting Chief of Beirut Police, General Naji Mulaeb, and
informed him about the call from Mr. El-Nammar Nammar
and asked him to check with Judge Mezher whether he was Aouareaware
of this decision. General Mulaeb called Judge Mezher, who was Aouareaware
of the decision to re-open the road and had no objection. General Mulaeb then
asked what should be done with the vehicles.
Judge Mezher replied that they should be brought to a secure place and
proposed the Helou Barracks (witness statement).
69. The next morning, 15 February 2005, Mr. El-Nammar Nammar
met with the Governor of Beirut, Mr. Yacoub Sarraf, in order to arrange for the
re-opening of the Minae Al-Hosn Street.
Sarraf is very close to the Republican Palace and he was also aware of
the decision (witness statement).
General Hisham El-Aouar
70. With regard to the removal of the motorcade, General
Mr. El-Aouar indicated that he did not
know who gave the order. He was asked to assist in the filming of the removal
of the motorcade on 14 February 2005 during the meeting with the Investigative
Judge, but nothing else was mentioned about the removal of the motorcade
vehicles from the crime scene. On that same evening, between 2230 and 2300 hrs,
he was at the office of the ISF General Director, Mr.
General Ali Al-Hajj, and he told him that the cars were going to
be removed. He also told him that the ISF had to provide assistance by marking
the locations of the vehicles and their filming (witness statement).
Director General Fadi
El-Nammar Nammar
71. Mr. El-Nammaer
did not remember whether General Mr. Al-Hajj
telephoned him on 14 February 2005, but he remembered his calling Mr.
General Al-Hajj the next day, as he always did in similar
situations. At the time of the
telephone call, he was at the office of the Governor of Beirut. He told Mr.
General Al-Hajj that they were prepared, if needed, to offer
help. Mr.
General Al-Hajj passed him on to a General working for ISF, who
told him that there was a survey going on at the crime scene. The General
stated he would come back to Mr. El-Nammar Nammar
in due course. Mr. El-Nammar Nammar
did not recall the name of the General, but he was with Al-Hajj. He had no
authority to decide to open roads in Beirut and he did not give any orders to
remove the motorcade vehicles. He also denied any contacts to the Republican
Palace(witness statement).
72. Subsequently, it was confirmed (by telephone lists) that Mr.
General Ali Al-Hajj made the telephone call from his landline to
Mr.
El-Nammar Nammar’s mobile phone on the evening
of 14 February 2005. It was also
confirmed that Mr. El-Nammar Nammar made
the telephone call to Mr. General
Al-Hajj the following day (witness
statement).
The Governor of Beirut, Mr. Mr.Yacoob
Sarraf
73. According to his statement he did not give any instructions.
The Army and the Police took over. He
had telephone contact with Mr. Fadi El-Nammar Nammar
on 14 February 2005.
Acting Commander of Beirut
Police, Mr. General
Naji Mulaeb
74. Between 2030 and 2200 hrs on 14 February 2005, Mr.
General Mulaeb received a telephone call at his office from
General Ali Al-Hajj who ordered Mr.
General Mulaeb to transfer the convoy vehicles from the crime
scene and secure them in a safe place, on the understanding that within two
days the road would be re-opened. If experts wanted to come and inspect the
vehicles, they would be available. Mr.
General Mulaeb was surprised by this order and did not accept it.
He told Mr. General
Al-Hajj that he had nothing to do with the crime scene, since the site was
under the authority of Judge Mezher. Mr.
General Al-Hajj told Mr.
General Mulaeb to contact the Judge, which he did. The Judge was also surprised and asked the
reason for the hurry. Mr. General
Mulaeb told him that he received his orders from General Al-Hajj and that he
was surprised as well. The Judge told him to give him some time and that he
would call back. After a while, between 10 and 30 minutes, the Judge called
back and said that the cars could be transferred (witness statement).
General Mustapha Hamdan
75. After the blast on 14 February 2005, Mr.
General Hamdan took all necessary measures to protect the
President and the Presidential areas. He did not recall any details, but he did
not go to the scene of the blast. He
did not issue any orders or directives regarding the activities at the crime
scene, since it did not fall within his responsibilities. Thus, he had nothing
to do with any orders to clean the street, to fill the crater or to remove the
motorcade vehicles (witness statement).
Head of Internal
Security Forces, General Ashraf Rifi
76. In a meeting with UNIIIC on 1 June 2005, General Rifi stated
that the person who gave the order to get a bulldozer or bulldozers to the
crime scene to fill the hole caused by the explosion etc. was General Mustapha
Hamdan, who at the time of the incident was the Commander of President Lahoud’s
security detail and therefore by Lebanese law had nothing to do with issues
related to crime scene investigation (witness statement).
Lebanese
Investigation: Ahmad
Abu Adass
77. At approximately 1411 hrs on 14 February 2005, barely an hour
after the explosion, Leila Bassam of Reuters received an anonymous telephone
call from a man with an accent that was not Lebanese but which she could not
identify. According to Ms. Bassam, as
soon as she answered the call, the man directed her to “[w]rite this down,”
told her to be quiet, and then read the following statement in classical
Arabic:
“We, al nasra wal-jihad fee bilad Al-Sham,
declare that we have meted out due punishment to the infidel Rafik Hariri so
that he may be an example to others.”
The caller concluded with an
Islamic religious saying and then hung up.
78. Mr. Ghassan Ben Jeddou, the Beirut Bureau chief of Al-Jazeera,
recalls receiving four telephone calls that day related to the same claim of
responsibility. In the first telephone
call, a man whom Mr. Ben Jeddou described as speaking poor Arabic in an
African, Afghan or Pakistani accent, claimed that Al-Nasra wal Jihad was responsible for Mr. Hariri’s execution by a
suicide bomb. Shortly thereafter,
Al-Jazeera informed the public about this claim of responsibility. Al-Jazeera next received a call from another
anonymous person claiming to be from the same group, this time a fluent Arabic
speaker, who explained where Ben Jeddou and his colleagues could locate a
videocassette containing further information about the assassination -- namely,
in a tree near the ESCWA building in downtown Beirut -- and directing them to
fetch the tape within 15 minutes. Mr.
Ben Jeddou sent a colleague to locate the videocassette. Eventually, who at first could not
find it eventually found a white envelope containing a
type-written detailed statement and a videocassette was found. After more calls from the same group asking
why the tape had not yet been aired, Al-Jazeera aired the footage later that
afternoon.
79. The letter accompanying the tape, purporting to be from the
Nasra and Jihad Group of Greater Syria, states in part:
“Praise be to God for the banner of Nasra
and Jihad is victorious in Greater Syria, and with God’s blessings the agent of
the infidels in Mecca and Medina, Rafik Hariri, has been meted out his due
punishment through a suicide operation executed by the Mujahid Ahmad Abu Adass
bearing the banner of Nasra and Jihad in Greater Syria on Monday, 14 February
2005, the 5th of Muhurram 1426 according to the Islamic Calendar, in
Beirut. …. Attached is film recording of the martyr Ahmad Abu Adass, executor
of the operation.”
In the tape, an individual
identifying himself as Abu Adass Mr. Abu Adass,
uses similar phraseology.
80. Soon after the airing of the tape, the Lebanese authorities
had acquired extensive information about Abu Adass Mr.
Abu Adass’s background and began questioning his family and
associates. Much of this information
apparently came from Sheikh Ahmed Abdel-Al, of Al-Ahbash, an Islamic group
active in the area of the Palestinian camps where Abu Adass Mr.
Abu Adass had reportedly lived.
Sheikh Abdel-Al stated to UNIIIC that he received a telephone call from
the presidential palace shortly after the airing of the Abu AdassAbu
Adass video, enquiring whether Abdel-Al had any information about Mr. Abu
Adass. According to Mr. Abdel-Al,
he obtained information about Mr. Abu Adass’s background, including
his address, the fact that he often went to Ein al Helwa, that he was a Wahabi,
that he was well-educated, had probably studied computer science, and that he
visited Abu Obeida (deputy to the leader of Jund al Sham). Sheikh Abdel-Al also obtained the names of Abu
Adass Mr. Abu Adass’ family and
friends: he sent this information by
facsimile to President Lahoud, Ali Hajj, Albert Karam, Jamea Jamea, and Maher al Toufeily. Sheikhh Abdel-Al reportedly also met with
Syrian intelligence official, Jamea Jamea, on the evening of 14 February 2005
and gave him the information about Abu Adass Mr.
Abu Adass, which Jamea Jamea subsequently relayed to the ISF.
81. The ISF visited Abu Abass’ house, accompanied by a member of
Al-Ahbash, and seized a computer, as well as a number of compact disks which
were primarily of a fundamentalist Islamic nature. Although the report on the search noted that most of the
documents stored on the computer were downloaded from the internet, there was
no indication that Mr. Abu Adbass’
home had internet access. Many of Abu
Adass Mr. Abu Adass’ friends and relatives
were interviewed extensively by the authorities (including by the ISF and
military intelligence) in the days immediately following the explosion. Abu AdassMr. Abu
Adass himself, however, could not be located. On the day of the explosion 10 people were
questioned and over the course of next two months approximately 40 people were
interviewed. The Lebanese investigation
further revealed that Mr. AdassAbu
Adass had been employed at a computer shop in the summer of 2004,
which was owned in part by Sheikh Ahmed Al-Sani, who was a member of the Ahmed
Miqati and Ismaíl Al-Khatib network.
82. In a report dated 17 February 2005, from General Sayyed to
Judge Mezher, General Sayyed concluded that the videotape was authentic and
“Ahmad Abu Addas, who appears on the tape, was . . . clearly a definite
participant in the assassination.” The
only basis provided for this conclusion was the statement that “[t]he way in
which he delivers the statement and shows himself without any covering over his
face is the manner adopted by suicide bombers in similar cases. The fact that he did not conceal his face
while making the statement indicates that he must have been personally
responsible for setting off the explosion.”
(Information About Facts Relating to the Broadcast on Al-Jazeera of a Videotape Claiming
Responsibility, No. 606/A’A, 17
February 2005)
Australian Investigation
83. On 15 February 2005, a request was forwarded to the Australian
Federal Police from the Prosecutor General requesting that six individuals be
arrested as suspects for participating in the Hariri assassination. The responsible ISF official at Beirut
International Airport, informed ISF General Al-Hajj about these six
individuals. General Al-Hajj
transmitted this information directly to Prosecutor General, Judge Rabia
Kaddoura, who contacted the Australian authorities. The Australian investigation absolved these six suspects of any
involvement in this crime, a position with which the Lebanese authorities in
charge of the investigation agreed.
84. The records indicate that the Lebanese authorities based their
suspicion on the following factors:
a)
The six persons of interest departed from Beirut International
Airport one and a half hours after the bombing occurred;
b) The
six persons had no luggage; and
c) One
of the six persons bore a resemblance to Abu Adass Mr.
Abu Adass, who was depicted in a video of an extremist group that
had claimed responsibility for the bombing.
85. The Australian authorities executed an extensive investigation
to assist the Lebanese authorities. The investigation included raising airport
alerts, interviews of the six individuals and other members of the group,
explosive residual swabbing (including the individuals, their airplane seating,
and their luggage), and examining the aircraft for possible explosives. Although it was reported that the six
persons identified as “suspects” were without luggage, they in fact were
carrying luggage. Three of the six
suspects subject to a forensic examination.
86. The findings of the Australian investigation revealed: (1) The group was traveling to Jeddah as
part of a religious pilgrimage; (2) No common organic or inorganic explosive or
post-blast residue was detected in any of the samples taken; and (3) No person
interviewed by the Australian authorities with respect to this investigation
had any involvement nor any knowledge about any involvement in the Hariri assassination.
V. THE COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATION
Overview
87. UNIIIC was declared operational by the Secretary General on 16
June 2005. From 16 June to 6 October
2005, 244 witness statements, 293 investigator’s notes and 22 suspect
statements have been issued. A number of searches have been conducted and 453
crime scene exhibits have been seized. A total of 16,711 pages of documents
have been produced. 30 Thirty investigators
from 17 different nations have been involved in the UNIIIC investigative
measures, as well as external experts.
88. At the outset, the time factor affecting the Commission has to
be emphasized. UNIIIC was declared
operational four months after the actual crime, which means that the
perpetrators and their accomplices have had plenty of time to destroy evidence
and/or to collude with each other, the ability to recall of potential witnesses
has been diminished, and previous omissions and inadvertent or deliberate loss
and destruction of evidence could not be undone.
89. The first month after the Secretary-General declared UNIIIC
operational was focused on updating the investigators on the current status of
the investigation, including an assessment of measures undertaken by the
Lebanese authorities. Much time was
spent on analysis of material handed over to the Commission by the Prosecutor
General, followed by interviews for clarification with key witnesses, based on
written materials on the following topics:
§ Reconstruction
of actions and whereabouts of Mr. Hariri prior to the blast.
§ Findings and
results from activities by the Lebanese authorities undertaken at the crime
scene and adjacent areas.
§ Tampering
with evidence.
§ Road works at
the scene prior to the blast.
§ The Abu Adass
track
§ The
Mitsubishi Canter Vanvan
§ Collection
and analysis of telephone lists
§ Collection
and analysis of CCTV-material, videos and photos collected from a diversity set
of possessors depicting the scene prior to and after the blast.
§ Financial
transactions.
90. These measures in turn led to new witnesses. A public information “hot line” was
installed on which anybody could approach the Commission about the case: this measure resulted in several new
interviews and new clues that needed to be followed up.
91. The compilation and organization of files and evidence were was time-consuming,
involving maintaining and improving the system for storing and recording
evidence, which includes thousands of pages of documents and written
testimonies, as well as numerous videos and photographs. Legal issues highlighted the need for research
into Lebanese criminal law and procedure in order to ensure the proper
protocols for searches, arrests, suspect interviews, and charging documents.
The Lebanese authorities’ assistance in these matters was very praiseworthy.
92. The second month was characterized by a change in
investigative directions and priorities, in the sense that investigators
followed up new clues and tracked down new witnesses based on their conclusions
from previous measures and professional analysis. Many different sources
approached the Commission and provided the investigation with useful
information. The vast majority of
senior officials in the involved Lebanese authorities were interviewed to clarify
the allotment of competencies, chains-of-command, and their extent of
involvement, as well as decisions taken (or which were neglected). During this period of time the support base
of the Commission was reinforced and new software programmes were installed,
which made the data-base more operational.
93. During the third month, a full scale crime scene examination
was conducted by a joint Dutch / British / Japanese expert team at the site
itself and in adjacent areas, including the sea floor adjacent to the scene of
the blast. The aim of this operation was to find physical evidence at the crime
scene, to reconstruct the improvised explosive device (IED) used and to
identify the Mitsubishi Canter Vanvan.
The operation was accomplished in situ during September.
Planning of the Assassination
94. During all measures and efforts undertaken by the UNIIIC, no
new hard leads or traces regarding the motive and reason for assassinating Mr.
Hariri have emerged to supplement those which can be attributed to events
during the second half of 2004 which culminated in Mr. Hariri’s decision to
step down as the Prime Minister and the prognosis of the outcome of the general
elections in Lebanon. Strong indicators on the latter matter are the massive
Future Party election campaign; the Lebanese authorities’ reaction on the olive
oil affair, in February 2005, where the distributors were arrested (by the
Lebanese authorities while distributing free
olive at the behest of Mr. Hariri) (investigator
notes): and last but not least the factual outcome of the elections. New
witnesses have approached the Commission who were reluctant to have any
contacts with the Lebanese authorities due to lack of confidence, stating that
the assassination of the former Prime Minister could not have occurred without
the knowledge of the Lebanese authorities and the approval from Syria.
95. The structure and organization of the Syrian and Lebanese
intelligence services in Lebanon at the time of the blast, including protocols
for reporting, shows a pervasive impact
on everyday life in Lebanon. Good
examples of this are documents collected
from the former Syrian Intelligence post, Villa Jabr, at Bologna Forest,
Lebanon and an intercepted telephone conversation between Brigadier General Rustum
GhazaliGeneral Ghazali
and a prominent Lebanese official on 19 July 2004, at 0945 hrs (excerpt):
“
“Ghazali:I
know it is early but I thought we should keep up you posted. The President of
the Republic told me this morning that they are two to rule the country the
Prime Minister and him. He said that things cannot continue this way. The Prime
Minister is always irritating him and we are always shutting him up and yelling
at him. He made it clear he cannot continue this way.
(...)
X: Take
it easy on me. Can you appoint a new Government at this time?
Ghazali: Yes we can appoint one. What could be the problem? We can
name Botros Harb.
(…)
Ghazali: Let me tell you one thing. Let the worker’s movement take
the street on the 20th in Solidere and Koraytem.
X: Let’s
speak it over. Take it easily. I have to take into consideration the best
interests of Syrian and Lebanon.
Ghazali: We are keen on Syria’s best interest but I am now talking
about Rafik Hariri.
X: So,
the decision is taken.
Ghazali: I wish to tell you one thing. Whenever we need to speak
to Hariri we have to suck up to him and he does not always answer.
X: To
hell with him. What do I care about him?
Ghazali: What do I care about him? The President can’t stand him
so why should I?
X: Fine,
may he rot in hell …
(…)
Ghazali: No. Let him be the laughing stock and be pointed at as
the person who ruined and indebted the country. Let the people take the street
in Koraytem and Solidere; let the manifestations continue until he is forced to
resign like a dog.
X: What about another option. I send him a
message saying: Resign God damn it.
Ghazali: No, don’t send him a message or else he will say they
forced me to resign. Let the street … you know what I mean. Or else he will use
this as a bargaining card with his American and French masters.
X: So
shall we leave things to the street?
Ghazali: This is better.
X: Let’s
go for it.” “
96. One witness of Syrian origin but resident in Lebanon, who
claims to have worked for the Syrian intelligence services in Lebanon, has
stated that approximately two weeks after the adoption of Security Council
resolution 1559, Maher Assad, Assef Shawkat, Hassan Khalil, Bahjat
Suleyman and Jamil Al-Sayyedsenior Lebanese and
Syrian officials decided to assassinate Rafik Hariri. He claimed
that Sayyed a senior Lebanese
security official went several times to Syria to plan the crime,
meeting once at the Meridian HotelHotel in
Damascus and several times at the Presidential Place and the office of Shawkata senior Syrian security
official. The last meeting was held in the house of Shawkat
the same senior Syrian security official approximately
7seven
to 10 days before the assassination and included Mustapha Hamdananother
senior Lebanese security official. The witness had close contact with high ranked
Syrian officers posted in Lebanon.
97. At the beginning of January 2005, one of the high ranked
officers told the witness that Rafik Hariri was a big problem to Syria.
Approximately a month later the officer told the witness that there soon would
be an “earthquake” that would re-write the history of Lebanon.
98. The witness visited several Syrian military bases in Lebanon.
At one such base, in Hammana, he observed a white Mitsubishi vanvan,
with a white tarpaulin over the flatbed. The observations were made on 11, 12
and 13 February 2005. The Mitsubishi
left the Military base in Hammana on the morning of 14 February 2005. The Mitsubishi Canter vanvan,
which was used as the bomb carrier, entered Lebanon from Syria through the
Bekaa border and a military hot lane on 21 January 2005, at 1320 hrs. It was driven by a Syrian Colonel from the
Army Tenth Division.
99. On 13 February 2005, the witness drove one of the Syrian
officers to the St. George area in Beirut on a reconnaissance exercise, as he
subsequently understood it to have been after the assassination took
place.
100. Regarding Mr. Abu Adass, the witness has stated
that he played no role in the crime except as a decoy. He was detained in Syria
(branch
251) and forced at gunpoint to record the video tape. Subsequently, he was killed in Syria. The
videotape was sent to Beirut on the morning of 14 February 2005, and handed over
to Jamil AEl Sayyed. A
civilian with a criminal record and an officer from the Sûureteé Géenéerale were tasked with putting the tape
somewhere in Hamra and then calling Ghassan Ben Jeddo, an Al-Jazeera TV
reporter.
101. General Jamil AEl-Sayyed,
according to the witness, cooperated closely with General Mustapha
Hamdan and General Raymond Azar in the
preparation of the assassination of Mr. Hariri. He also coordinated with Rustum GhazaliGeneral
Ghazali (and,
among others, people from Mr. Ahmad Jibreeil
in Lebanon). General Mustapha
Hamdan and General Raymond Azar
provided logistical support, providing money, telephones, cars, walkie-talkies,
pagers, weapons, ID-cards etc. Those who knew of the crime in advance were
among others, Nasser Kandil and General Ali
Al-Hajj.
102. Fifteen 15 minutes before the assassination, the
witness was in the vicinity of the St. George area. He received a telephone
call from one of the senior Syrian officers, who asked the witness where he
was. When he answered, he got the advice to leave the area immediately.
103. Another witness approached approached the
Commission and stated that he had met with Mustapha General
Hamdan in the middle of October 2004. General Hamdan talked very
negatively about Mr. Hariri accusing him of being pro-Israeli. General Hamdan ended the conversation by
stating: “We are going to send him on a trip, bye, bye Hariri”. After the
assassination, the witness was strongly reminded not to discuss this conversation
with anyone.
104. Another “witness” who, later became
a suspect, Zuhir Ibn Mohamed Said Saddik, has given detailed
information to the Commission about the crime, in particular insofar as the
planning phase is concerned. Paragraphs 105 to 110 set out the main points of
Mr. Saddik’s statement.
105. One of the main issues raised in Mr. Saddik’s statement was a
report that he said was drafted by Nasser
Kandil. This report stated that Mr. Hariri and Marwan Hamadeh had a meeting in
Sardinia. At the end of the report Kandil stated that a decision should be
taken to eliminate Mr. Hariri. Nasser
Kandil was tasked to plan and implement a campaign aiming at ruining Mr.
Hariri’s reputation on religious and media level. The Baath Party in Lebanon
decided that they should get rid of Mr. Hariri by any possible means and
isolate him sinceafter
President Lahoud’s attempt to remove him from the political scene failed.
106. Mr. Saddik stated that the decision to assassinate Mr. Hariri had
been taken in Syria, followed by clandestine meetings in Lebanon between senior
Lebanese and Syrian officers, who had
been designated to plan and pave the way for the execution of the assault.
These meetings started in July 2004 and lasted until December 2004. The seven
senior Syrian officials and four senior Lebanese officials were alleged to have
been involved in the plot.
107. Planning meetings started in Mr. Saddik’s apartment in Khaldeh
and were subsequently moved to an apartment in Al-Dahiyye, a district of
Beirut. Some of these individuals
visited the area around the St. George hotelHotel
under different guises and at different times for planning and preparation
purposes of the assassination.
108. Mr. Saddik also gave information about the Mitsubishi itself and
that the driver eventually assigned had been an Iraqi individual who had been
led to believe that the target was Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi (who
happened to be in Beirut prior to the assassination).
109. Mr. Saddik had been informed that TNT and some special explosives
had been used in order to direct suspicions towards extremist Islamic groups,
as these kinds of explosive had only been used in operations in Iraq.
110. A trip by Mr. Saddik with Abdel-Kareem Abbas led to a camp in
Zabadane. Al-Saddik claimed to have seen the Mitsubishi Canter van in this
camp: mechanics were working on it and emptying the sides. The sides of the
car’s flatbed, as well as the doors of the Mitsubishi had been widened and
filled with explosives, which had also been put underneath the driver’s seat.
In the camp he had seen a young man whom he had been able to identify as Abu
Adass Mr. Abu Adass after seeing the video
on TV on 14 February 2005.
111. On 30 August 2005, the Commission sent an official letter to
Syria with questions regarding the Zabadane camp. The answer was handed over
personally to the Commissioner in New York, confirming the existence of the
camp but denying it to be used for any other purposes than juvenile educational
activities. However, from other
information given to the Commission, there are strong indications of activities
within the camp during the period, 5-9 September 2005, geared towards changing
the features and operations within the premises. Satellite pictures also show
high walls and watch towers in the area.
112. On 26 September 2005, investigators of UNIIIC had a meeting with
Mr. Saddik. On 27 September, Mr. Saddik
confessed in a handwritten document that he had been participating participated
in the immediate planning phase before the assault assassination
(January and February 2005) and that he was acting as a driver for
several of the above-mentioned suspects during the entire day of 14 February.
113. Consequently, on 13 October 2005, on the suggestion of the
Commission, the Lebanese Prosecutor-General issued an arrest warrant concerning
Mr. Saddik, which led to his arrest on
16 October.
114. At the present stage of investigation, a certain amount of
information given by Mr. Saddik cannot be confirmed through other evidence.
115. The wife of Mr. Saddik has confirmed that, during the period July to December 2004, her husband met a
huge group of people on several occasions in their home in Khaldehh
as at other locations. He did not want
her to be present, since these people wished not to be identified. She has also confirmed visits at their home
by and Dhafer Al-Yussef, in the company of three other men unknown to her. The
fact that Mr. Saddik implies himself with the assassination, which ultimately
led to his arrest, adds to his credibility.
116. The fact that Mr. Saddik implicates himself witinh
the assassination, which ultimately led to his arrest, adds to his credibility.
117. Other witnesses have informed the Commission that the day before
the assassination of Mr. Hariri, the late chief of Mr. Hariri’s close
protection (Mr. Yehya Al-Arab alias Abu Tareq) had a meeting with Mr.
General Ghazali. It seemed that Mr. Al-Arabhe
was badly shaken up by that meeting. Instead of reporting immediately to Mr.
Hariri as usual, he went to his house, turned off his phone and stayed there
for a few hours. The version given by Mr.
General Ghazali of this meeting is not compatible with the
information given by other witnesses to the Commission.
Other elements to be
considered
118. Some other circumstances to be kept in mind regarding the
planning phase of the crime are the surveillance measures targeting Mr. Hariri
undertaken by the ISF and the wiretapping of Mr. Hariri’s
telephones by the Military Intelligence (see section Surveillance and telephone
wiretapping of Mr. Hariri).
119. One of the first measures General Al-Hajj undertook after being
appointed to the post as the Head of the Internal Security Forces was to reduce
the number of state security personnel around Mr. Hariri from a level of 40
down to eight 8 in
November 2004. The reason was asserted
to be a letter from the Lebanese President and the Prime Minister that Lebanese
law should be applied on all levels and in all matters. According to a decree
(3509 of 1993), the number of security staff for a person in the Hariri
category should be eight8. Whether anyone else was affected by the same
decree, the Commission has not been able to ascertain.
120. There are still some activities on the Minae Al-Hosn Street in
Beirut prior to the blast that have to be further investigated, which could
elucidate details from the planning phase and as such lead to the perpetrators.
121. The iInvestigations
shows that eight8
telephone numbers and 10 mobile telephones were used to organize surveillance on Mr. Hariri and to carry out the
assassination. The lines were put into circulation on 4 January 2005 in the
northern part of Lebanon, between Terbol and Menyeh. The lines were used on individual days to observe Mr. Hariri’s
habits, mostly in the area of Beirut city.
122. On 14 February 2005, six6
of the telephone were used in the area stretching from Parliament squareSquare
to the St. George hotelHotel and
the axes of Zqaq el Blat and Al Bachoura. The calls occurred at 1100 hrs. They
covered all routesexits
linking the Parliament to Kuraytem Palace.
The telephone located at the Parliament made four calls to the other
telephones at 1253 hrs, the time when the Hariri motorcade left Nejmeh squareSquare. The telephones have been inactive since the
blast at 1256 hrs. The lines were only used to make calls with each other for
the entire period from early January to 14 February 2005.
123. With all these circumstances in mind, including the previously outlined
described conversation of 26 August
2004, what is there is
little probability for that a
third party wouldto undertake
surveillance and monitoring measures against Mr. Hariri for more than a month
prior to the blast and maintain the resources, logistics and capacity needed to
initiate, plan and commit a crime of this magnitude, without the knowledge of
the competent Lebanese authorities. ? This
includes the procurement, handling and maintenance of a large quantity of
highly aggressive explosive, a stolen Mitsubishi Canter vVan,
the recruitment of the related human resources, as well as a base station for
necessary preparations.
Conclusion:
There is probable cause to believe that the decision to assassinate
former Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, could not have been taken without the
approval of top-ranked Syrian security official and could not have been further
organized without the
collusion of their counterparts in the Lebanese security services.
Hariri telephone wire-tapping
124. Accroding to a witness, ISF personnel
were ordered to keep Mr. Rafik Hariri under surveillance (witness
statement) at the
end of January and beginning of February 2005.
No documentation on this topic has been found during UNIIIC
investigative measures.
125. Mr. Rafik Hariri’s telephone lines were
constantly under wire-tapping. The measures were undertaken by the Army
Intelligence in cooperation with representatives from the Surete
Generale. The protocols were forwarded on daily basis to
General Raymond Azar, General Michel Suleyman and General Jamil Al-Sayyed. Mr.
Azar also forwarded the protocols to the President of the Lebanese Republic and
to the chief of the Syrian Intelligence Service, who was Ghazi Kanaan and then
Rustum Ghazali. No documentation on this topic has been found during UNIIIC
investigative measures.
126125. Colonel Ghassan Tufayli was
responsible in the Lebanese Military Intelligence Service for the technical
department. It included the telecommunication - and the wire tapping -service.
The department tapped political, military and suspect people. His superior was
the head of the Military Intelligence Service, General Raymond Azar. ColonelMr.
Tufayli received his orders from his superior in oral rather than written form.
Several important people such as former presidents, prime ministers and
deputies were permanently wiretapped. Although Mr. Hariri was no longer Prime
Minister in early 2005, he was a very important political and economic figure
in Lebanon and the Middle East. Therefore he was
under permanent wiretapping. The technical department overheard monitored
and recorded conversations.
Staff from the Lebanese Surete
GeneraleSûreté Générale supported Tufayli’s
army unit. The protocols were forwarded on a daily basis to General Raymond
Azar and to the head of the army, General Michel Suleyman. The head of the
Lebanese Surete GeneraleSûreté
Générale , Jamil Al-Sayyed, was also provided with the results.
According to ColonelGhassan
Tufayli’s statement, General Raymond Azar sent the protocols to the Lebanese
President and to Rustum GhazaliGeneral Ghazali,
the head of the Syrian Military Intelligence Service in Lebanon.
1267. Colonel Mr. Tufaily
mentioned that the Republican Guard Brigade also had an internal wiretapping
service.
Conclusion:
Through the constant wire-tapping of Mr. Hariri’s telephone lines, the
Syrian and Lebanese security and intelligence services were kept informed of
his movements and contacts.
Roadworks
1278. The Commission also investigated whether there
was excavation work in the road in front of the St. George hotelHotel
in the period before the assassination.
There have been suggestions that unusual road works – including the
installation of wires and open manholes – occurred in the road in front of the
St. George hotelHotel
shortly before the assassination, implying that individuals involved in the
assassination may possibly have had an opportunity to install a bomb or a
remote bomb device underneath the road, thus causing the explosion.
1289. Municipal records show that the last work
permits for work in the area near the crime scene, granted
prior to the blast for work in the area of the crime scene
were provided in January 2005. For
example, from 3 to 8 January 2005, the Beirut Water
authorities were provided permits to dig for a water pipe and to excavate the
main roads around the St. George hotelHotel. Ogero, the telecommunications company, was
granted a permit to install a telecommunications cable between 13 and 20
January 2005. However, some witnesses
have stated that there may in fact have been road works conducted in the area
in front of St. George closer to the day of the explosion, including the night
before. For example, a taxi driver
reported that he dropped two passengers at the Phoenicia HotelHotel
on 12 February 2005 at approximately 0615 hrs in the morning. As he turned left onto Minet El Hosn, he
realized that the street was closed just in front of the St. George hotelHotel
facing the HSBC bank and that some road works were being conducted, including
two open manholes in front of the St. George, and that workers and military
personnel were present at the location.
Another witness, a marina worker, noted that while the installation of
the telephone wires had started at the marina, they were not in use as they had
not been connected to an external wire and no cables were connected for the
television or computers. Another
individual reported that on Sunday afternoon, the day before the
assassination, as he and his wife approached the site of the explosion, they
saw three people working in the middle of the street and lowering into a hole
in the ground near the St. George hotelHotel
what appeared to be a pallet and also observed two black cables with about half
inch in diameter running from the hole to the St. George hotelHotel. By contrast, other witnesses were certain
that there were no road works in the vicinity in the days prior to the
explosion.
Conclusion:
The issue of whether there was excavation in front of the St. George hotelHotel remains an open question that the Commission
has not been able to resolve beyond certain witnesses’ recollections which have
not been independently substantiated.
Municipal records do appear to make clear, however, that such excavation
close to the time of the crime was not carried out pursuant to city permits.
Execution of the Bombing
12390. A branch of the HSBC bank is located
close to the scene of the explosion. The bank operated its own CCTV security
system which recorded the movements of the Hariri motorcade immediately prior
to the explosion, but did not record the scene of the blast itself. On close
scrutiny, the recorded footage showed a white Mitsubishi Canter vanvan
entering the area of the explosion shortly before Mr. Hariri’s convoy.
1301. The recording clearly showed that this
Mitsubishi Canter was moving approximately six times slower than all other
vehicles traversing the same stretch of roadway. A time series analysis showed
that for the approximately 50 meters of road covered by the camera, a normal
car took 3-4 seconds to cover the distance, while a large truck took 5-6
seconds to travel the distance. The Mitsubishi Canter took approximately 22
seconds to travel the distance and entered the area oneI
minute and 49 seconds before the Hariri convoy.
1312. Collected samples from the crime scene and
further forensic examinations, have succeeded in identifying the Mitsubishi
Canter vanvan. Through a part of the engine block, found and
collected at the crime scene, it has been concluded that the engine comes from
a Mitsubishi vehicle stolen on 12 October 2004 in Sagamihara City, Japan.
1323. The Commission has interviewed all the
survivors who were involved in the Hariri motorcade, eyewitnesses on the spot
and in adjacent areas as well as shop owners, employees, vendors, residents etc
in the neighborhood of the crime scene.
1334. None of the people interviewed hass
made any unusual observations on 14 February 2005, at Minae Al-Hosn Street or
in adjacent areas of activity different from the normal situation at these
locations.
1345. One of the main issues for the Commission was to
figure to to determine how it was known thatwhich
route
Mr.
Rafik Hariri wouldas going to
take the Maritime route on his way back to
the Kuraytem Palace from the meeting at the Parliament.
1356. It was a common knowledge that Mr. Hariri
would attend the pre-election meeting at the Parliament this particular
morning. It was also known that he would return to the Kuraytem Palace after
the meeting, since he had invited more than twenty people for lunch at the
Palace.
1367. From the Nejmeh Ssquare
back to QoreitemKuraytem
there were three options of routes. The decision to takego
the Maritime road was madetaken just
before departure by a senior staff member in Mr. Hariri’s private security
detail and communicated to the lead car, but it was already envisaged in the
morning that if the motorcade was able to
return to the Palace before 144.00 they
would have chosen the Maritime road. If not,
another road would have been taken. The motorcade left the Nejmeh squareSquare
area and drove along Ahdab Street and Foch Street. At the junction of Foch
Street and the Seaport Street the convoy was delayed for several minutes due to
some traffic hindrance. At the mentioned junction the convoy turned left and
took the Maritime road towards Ain Mreisa and the St. George hotelHotel.
1378. The motorcade was composed of of six
cars. The first car, a Toyota Land Cruiser, was manned with four officers from
the Internal Security Forces, the second was a Mercedes 500 S manned by three
persons from Mr. Hariri’s private security team. The third car was an armored
Mercedes driven by Mr. Hariri and with Mr. Fleyhan as passenger. The fourth and
the fifth cars were Mercedes 500 S, each manned by three security officers from
Mr.
Hariri’s private security team and positioned in the convoy on the
flanks of the third car number three.
The last car in the convoy was a Chevrolet, fully equipped as an ambulance and
manned by three Hariri staff members, two of whom were paramedics. The second,
fourth and fifth cars were equipped with jamming devices,
which were switched on and functional.
1389. When the motorcade passed the St. George hotelHotel
at Minae Al-Hosn Street, at 12.56 hours, a huge explosion occurred,
which resulted in the death of Mr. Hariri and 21 others. MoreoverIn
addition, more than 220 persons weregot
injured and the damages toon
surrounding buildings and vehicles wasere
severe. Mr. Hariri was takenbrought to
the American University Hospital, where his body was identified and the cause
of death concluded to be immediate brain injury resulting in cardiac arrest.
13940. AnThe
Opel which followed the motorcade from Nejmeh squareSquare
to the junction of Foch Street and Seaport Street has not been identified. It has to
be stressedshould be noted that because
the motorcade was delayed at a T-junction,
during for a short
while the motorcadeit went
against the traffic on a one-way street from Nejmeh SquareSquare
to Foch Street, followed by the Opel. The Commission has not succeeded in
elucidating the reason for the delay of the motorcade at the T-junction.
1401. TIn the
FitzGerald report it is concluded
that Mr. Hariri during the last three months prior to the blast only
had taken the Maritime Road at six6 different
occasions, but it should be kept in mind that, during the same period of time,
he only appeared in public in the Beirut areas fewerless
than 10 times.
1412. The Commission has not found any indications
that there were leaks from, or accomplices,
within Mr. Hariri’s close staff members. However, it is concluded UNIIIC
determined that Mr. Hariri was under surveillance at least one
month prior to the blast, by people planning the crime (see the phone analysis
section above).
1423. The weaknesses in the initial measures taken
by the Lebanese authorities and the tampering with evidence during the first
crime scene examination have worked against identifying the typekind
of explosives used in the blast. The first collected samples of residues were just tested
in an “itemizer”, which only gives an indication of the explosives. In this
case it indicated TNT, but no forensic laboratory examinations of the samples
were undertaken. This fact has hampered the investigation, since it has been
impossible to track down the origin of the explosives, which subsequently could
lead to the perpetrators.
1434. In addition, no other CCTV security systems
were seized in the area except those from the HSBC bank. This negligence could
have led to the loss of important evidence.
Conclusion:
It would not have been difficult for individuals outside of Hariri’s
“inner circle” to predict the route that his convoy would follow on 14 February
2005. The Mitsubishi Canter Vanvan
shown on the HSBC bank CCTV security system was the carrier of the
explosives. The negligence of the
Lebanese authorities to undertake proper investigative measures and a
full-scale professional crime scene examination immediately after the blast hasve
made it difficult to resolve key questions regarding the execution of the
bombing, such as the type of explosive used, or may have resulted in the
potential loss of important evidence, such as useful CCTV videos.
Use of Prepaid Telephone Cards
1445. Investigations by both the ISF and Military
Intelligence have led to six pre-paid calling cards, which telephone records
demonstrate were instrumental in the planning of the assassination. Beginning at approximately 1100 hrs on 14
February 2005, cell site records show that cellular telephones utilizing these
six calling cards were located in the area stretching from the ParliamentNejmeh
squareSquare
to the St. George hotelHotel,
within a few-block radius and made numerous calls with each other and only with
each other. The phones were situated so
that they covered every route linking the Parliament to KQuorayitem
Palace: that is, cellsite records demonstrate that these telephones were placed
to cover any route that Hariri would have taken that day. One of the cellphones located near the
Parliament made four calls with the other telephone lines at 1253 hrs --- the
time that Mr. Hariri’s convoy left the Nejmeh
Square square . The calls --- and all usage on the cards ---
terminated at 1253 hrs on 14 February, a few minutes before the blast. The lines have all been inactive since.
1456. Further investigation has revealed that these
six lines --- along with two others --- were put into circulation on the 4th of
January 2005, after calling number 1456 activated them. They were all activated at the same location
in northern Lebanon between Terbol and Menyeh.
Since they were first purchased in early January 2005, until the time of
the explosion, the lines only had calls with each other. In that time period, until the
assassination, there appears to be a correlation between their location and
Hariri’s movements, suggesting
that they mightmay have
been used to follow Hariri’s movements in that time period.
1467. The Commission, in conjunction with the
Lebanese authorities, continued the investigation of the origin of these
telephone lines. The six pre-paid cards
originated, along with four others, from the Powergroup Company, Beirut, a
store owned by a reportedly active member of Al-Al-Ahbash with close ties to
Sheikh Ahmad Abdel-Al. According to company
records, the lines were delivered to the store’s Tripoli branch. One of the employees of that Tripoli store
reported that on the 30th December 2004, he received a
telephone call from Raed Fakhreddin, the owner of another cell shop in Tripoli
and the nephew of Tarek Ismat Fakhreddin, a prominent businessman and
consultant to former Lebanese prime minister Omar Karame. Raed Fakhreddin reportedly urgently wanted
to buy 10 prepaid cards; the Tripoli store employee noted that the inquiry
itself was unusual as Raed Fakhreddin did not customarily buy lines from the
Tripoli store nor typically have commercial dealings with the Tripoli store
other than mobile handset purchases.
However, the ten calling cards bearing these particular lines were
located, and Raed Fakhreddin sent a messenger to pick up the calling cards
bearing these lines from the Tripoli store.
That messenger reported to the Commission that he paid $700 USD in cash
at the Tripoli store to purchase these ten lines and deliver them to Raed Fakhreddin. The forms legally required for purchasing
cellular lines were not filled out that day, however, but rather over two weeks
after the lines had been sold, on 12 January 2005. The supporting identification required for the purchase, which
was provided by Raed Fakhreddin, proved to be false. On 14 September 2005, the ISF arrested Raed Fakhreddin, along
with others involved in the transfer and sale of these calling cards. Raed Fakhreddin was subsequently interviewed as a suspect by
the Commission. In that interview,
while he admitted that he purchased the lines, he denied any knowledge of the
use of six of the lines in connection with the Hariri assassination.
1478. Of the ten mobile phones used in connection
with these ten cellular telephone cards, five have been traced to a store in
Tripoli.
Conclusion:
The investigation of the prepaid telephone cards is one of the most
important leads in this investigation in terms of who was actually on the
ground executing the assassination.
This is a line of investigation that needs to be pursued
thoroughly.
Jamming Devices
1489. Hariri’s convoy included three vehicles
equipped with jamming devices, designed to disturb the signals of remotely-controlled
Improvised
Explosive Devices (IED).
14590. Although UNIIIC received information
from one source that a trusted associate of Mr. Hariri’s
had tampered with the jamming devices prior to the blast, the Commission has
not been able to corroborate this information.
Indeed, all available evidence indicates that these jamming devices were
operational and in proper working condition at the time of the
assassination. Those responsible for
managing the jamming devices reported that they conducted a detailed check of the
jammers every three months, an operation performed for the last time in early
January 2005 when no problems were observed.
In addition, the jamming system was checked by a member of Mr. Hariri’s
security detail two days before the explosion and was deemed to be in good
working condition. Of the three jamming
devices, one was completely destroyed by the blast, another was burned but was
retrieved and is maintained as evidence, and a third was still operational and,
upon testing, was found to be working properly. Moreover, the report of the Dutch forensic explosives experts
about the two devices which survived as evidence
further concluded that the intact jammer had essentially been operational. Finally, the telecommunication firmsnetworks,
MTC Touch and ALFA, reported that their networks were
disruptedturbed
on 14 February from about 1200 hrs to 1300 hrs between Place de l’Etoile and
the St. George hotelHotel. UNIIIC investigators conducted a
reconstruction on 19 August 2005 in cooperation with MTC and ALFA, by taking
three vehicles similar to those in Mr. Hariri’s
convoy equipped with similar jamming devices along the same route that the
convoy took from the Place de l’Etoile to the St. George hotelHotel. This reconstruction produced relatively
similar results regarding the temporary disruption of telecommunications as
occurred on 14 February, even accounting for other factors that could have
affected telecommunications in the area.
Thus, it can be assumed that at least one of the three jamming devices
was operational and functional at the time of the explosion.
1501. Even though at least one jamming device was
operational, investigation has revealed that there are ways to overcome,
avoid, evade or use jamming devices. Different possibilities include a suicide bomber,;
a wireless explosion using different frequencies from those of the jamming
devices or using the frequencies of the jamming devices or the
jammed frequencies,; a wireless
explosion using the jamming devices themselves,;
a wireless explosion using a satellite phone from Thuraya, the only telephone
company working on Lebanese territory with satellite links,;
a wired explosion using a TNT cable,;
or a wired explosion using another kind of installed cable such as a telephone
line as a connecting wire. Although it
appears to the Commission based on its investigation to date, specifically, the
results of the Dutch forensic examination of the crime scene, that it is
possible that a suicide bomber caused this explosion, these other possibilities
warrant further investigation, both as to whether they were feasible standing
alone or in conjunction with a suicide bomber.
Conclusion:
It appears that the jamming devices in Hariri’s convoy were operational
and functional on 14 February at the time of the blast. Further investigation may provide
information about the feasibility of activationhow
of
the IED was activated.
Telecommunications interferences in downtown Beirut
1512. UNIIIC received information that there was
interference on 14 February 2005 from 0900 hrs until 1400 hrs of the
telecommunications antenna covering the area of Riad Solh, which includes the
crime scene area. The matter was investigated together with
the Ministry of Telecommunication. This information was confirmed through
information provided by the telecommunications provider MTC Touch.
Consequently, the mobile phone callers on the crime scene area could not use
this specific antenna and were diverted to other antennas. No evidence has been found to date which
would clearly point to internal manipulation at MTC Touch, although such
internal manipulation cannot yet be completely discounted. It remains equally possible that an outside
individual, criminal organization, company or authority would also have been able
to generate such interferences, for example with a mobile appliance. Moreover,
a direct connection between these interferences and the assassination cannot be
excluded.
Conclusion:
It appears that there was interference with a telecommunications antenna
in the crime scene area during the time of the crime. This is a line of enquiry that should be thoroughly pursued.
Crime Scene
1523. Up until the
establishment of UNIIIC, the Lebanese authorities had not carried out a
thorough crime scene examination. Since
this constitutes the basis of any criminal investigation, the Commission deemed
it necessary to seek the assistance of UN member states to second experts in
order to determine primarily, among other things, whether the explosion took
place aboveground or underground.
The German Forensic Team
1534.
On 6 July 2005, the German Forensic Team, comprising four forensic experts,
submitted their report to UNIIIC.
Excerpts of the most important paragraphs conclude:
“The
Swiss expert team’s findings and conclusions can be fully supported. Due to the
distribution of the so far located parts of a Mitsubishi Canter lorry, it can
be assumed that that vehicle played a significant part in the course of action
and was possibly used as carrier of the bomb.
After
the assessment of all facts and estimations an aboveground explosion is the
most feasible possibility. If we assume such an explosion, the amount of
explosive must have been around 1,000 kg. Highly aggressive explosive was used.
The result of an A-sample from the crater wall shows that TNT was used. But
this result is not one that has been achieved in the presence of an expert from
the UN Fact Finding Mission to Lebanon and thus must be regarded as preliminary
and not finally confirmed result. During our work at the location of the
incident we could not detect any hints with regard to the kind of trigger that
has been used”.
The Dutch Forensic Team
1545. During the period 12 August – 25 September
2005, a Dutch forensic team conducted an the examination of the prime crime
scene and periphery areas of interest. The team was composed of comprisedseven 7 experts specialized in
post-blast investigations. The objective for the forensic investigation of the
explosion site was to find physical evidence to reconstruct the improvised
explosive device (IED) which
caused the explosion. To examine a
crime scene nearly half a year after the incident occurred is not a common
practice. Moreover, it was known that the crime scene was disturbed on several
occasions. This seriously diminishes the strength of conclusions that can be
drawn from the location where the exhibits were found. It can never be excluded
that the materials at the crime scene were manipulated by someone or
intentionally put there. Notwithstanding, it was felt to be useful to carry out
a full crime scene search, mainly because it was likely that certain areas of
the crime scene had not been contaminated, such as the upper floors of the
Byblos and St George’s hotelHotel. The
crime scene area was cordoned off on 15 February 2005, according to ISF, and
was guarded 24/7 from this day on.
1556. The Dutch forensic team was assisted by many
people in carrying out the crime scene investigation, e.g. forensic police
officers from ISF, a team of British divers, a French expert on explosives, a
forensic scientist from Northern Ireland, a German electrical engineer
specialized on jamming devices, a team of Japanese crime scene investigators, a
German car expert, a Dutch car expert and a number of Lebanese specialists.
1567. A coherent and comprehensive report on the
findings and results from the crime scene investigation has been submitted to
the Commission. The report comprised 87 pages and contained four main conclusions:
1. Detonation
of high explosives
The damage
inflicted on the buildings, vehicles, surrounding lamp posts and other objects
in the vicinity of the explosion site demonstrates that a
large amount of high explosives was activated and detonated to the left side in
front of the main entrance of the St George’s hotelHotel
on Minae Al-Hosn Street. This detonation set fire to many vehicles within the
distance of 20 to 30 meters of the explosion centre. From the damage pattern it
is clear that it was one explosion of a charge of high explosives.
2. Mitsubishi
Canter vehicle
Regarding the
physical evidence recovered, the human remains identified by the Lebanese
forensic specialist, the HSBC security video and the damage on the vehicles
parked on the road, the most likely scenario is that a Mitsubishi Canter vanvan
containing the IED was activated when the Hariri convoy of six vehicles drove
by. The engine number of this Mitsubishi Canter vanvan
was found amongst the debris on the crime scene. This engine number has led to
the vehicle registration number and the production date.
No remains of
the constituents of the IED have been found amongst the
debris, apart from the vehicle parts of the Mitsubishi Canter in which the IED
was placed. Because of the size of the explosion and the exploded charge this
is not unexpected. A few damaged parts of circuit board have been recovered
which may be related to the activation mechanism. However, these circuit boards
should first be examined by electronics experts, who might give an indication
of the application of these boards.
3. Location
of convoy vehicles and bomb vehicle
When the
explosive was activated, the Mitsubishi Canter was parked almost in line with
the other parked vehicles along the pavement in front of the St George’s hotelHotel
with the front of the vehicle facing the west. It was not parked fully in line
judging from the direction of the explosion force acted on the red Ford vehicle
which was most likely parked directly in front of the Mitsubishi. This red Ford
vehicle was most severely damaged from the left rear side which means that the
Mitsubishi could not have been parked fully in line with the Red Ford vehicle.
Among the six
convoy vehicles the black Mercedes numbered 404 was closest to the explosion
center when the IED detonated. The direction of the explosive force on this
vehicle was from the right side, meaning it was most likely located alongside
of the Mitsubishi. From the damage patterns it can be stated that vehicles 401,
402 and 403, the latter with Messrs. Hariri and Fleyhan as
occupants, had just passed by the Mitsubishi when the explosion occurred.
Vehicles 405 and 406 have beenwere damaged
most severely at the right front side, meaning that these vehicles had not yet
driven by the Mitsubishi at the moment of the detonation.
4. Activation
mechanism of the IED
Regarding the
physical evidence presented in this report and the fact small human remains of
an unidentified person have been found and no large body parts such as legs,
feet or lower underarms,
the most likely scenario for the activation of the IED is a suicide bomber.
Another only slightly less likely possibility is that of a remotely-controlled
device. However, no residues of such a device have been recovered from the
crime scene.
The British
Forensic Team
1578. On 5 September 2005, the British Forensic Team
submitted their report to the Commission. The British team was composed of sevencomprised
7 experts. The objective for the team was to conduct a underwater
search of the sea floor and the Marina adjacent to the scene of the blast.
While performing their duties, the British team was assisted by Lebanese divers
from the Civil Defense Fire and Rescue Team. Forty items were collected and
seized during the underwater search, of which the vast majority were vehicle
parts.
The Japanese
Forensic Team
1589. On 27 September 2005, the Japanese team
submitted their report to the Commission. The team comprised of three forensic
experts accompanied by an interpreter. The objective of the team was to
identify the Mitsubishi Canter Vanvan.
15960. The Japanese experts examined all the
evidence recovered from the crime scene and sorted out 69 pieces as suspected
Mitsubishi Canter parts. Of the 69 pieces, 44 items were identified as Canter
parts by the Mitsubishi Fuso Corporation in Japan.
1601. The Mitsubishi Canter VanVan
was finally identified. The vehicle was stolen in Sagamihara City, Japan on 12
October 2004.
The Northern
Irish and French Experts on IEDs
1612. The experts were in agreement with the comments
and conclusions in the Dutch Forensic Team’s report.
Conclusion:
The explosion that killed Mr. Hariri and 22 others took place above
ground. For this purpose, an amount of
no less than 1000 kilgrams of military explosives was used.
AFTER THE CRIME :
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
1623. The Commission has undertaken extensive
measures to map Mr. Hariri, his whereabouts and doings prior to the blast as
well as other occurrences, in order to find the motive and the reasons behind
the crime.
1634. Interviews have been conducted with his
relatives, staff members, friends, associates and colleagues. None of these
efforts have led anywhere else than to the prelude of Mr. Hariri stepping down
from the post as Prime Minister.
1645. On the contrary,This
information has reinforced a the picture
of a tense relationship between Mr. Hariri on the one hand
and President Lahoud and the Syrian authoritiess
on the other., have been strengthened.
Evidence is also adduced from the phone conversation between Rustum GhazaliGeneral Ghazali
and a senior Lebanese official on 19 July 2004; the conversation between
President Assad and Mr. Hariri on 26 August 2004; in Syria, the approach to Mr.
Hariri by Yehya Al-Arab, Wissam El-Hassan and Salim Diab in October-November
2004 to increase the security around him due to the political tension and Mr.
Hariri’s response that “they don’t dare to touch me”; the meeting between Rustum GhazaliGeneral
Ghazali and
Yehya Al-Arab on 13 February 2005; and the Lebanese authorities response to the
distribution of olive oil during February 2005.
1656. All the key players amongstwithin
the competent Lebanese authorities have been interviewed as well as their
experts involved in the initial measures of the investigation. The eEarly
investigation showed a pattern that no one claimed they had the slightest clue
that something was going on around Mr. Hariri that could threaten his life. The
efforts undertaken by the Commission during a limited period of time have come
to a diametrically opposite conclusion. There were a number lot of
warning signs regarding Mr. Hariri’s security in histhe
immediate surroundings of Mr. Hariri in the aftermath of the
occurrences during the second half of 2004, in particular when it comes to the
context of previous Lebanese experiences of assaults targeting individuals
through bombings.
1667. On 30 August 2005, the Lebanese authorities
arrested and detained four high-level officials of the Lebanese security and
intelligence apparatus, pursuant to arrest warrants issued by the Lebanese
Prosecutor General based on recommendations from UNIIIC that there was probable
cause to arrest and detain them for conspiracy to commit murder in connection
with the assassination of Rafik Hariri.
The individuals arrested were General Jameel Al-Sayyed, former director
general the Surete GeneraleSûreté Générale ;
General Ali Al-Hajj, former head of the ISF; General Raymond Azar, former head
of military intelligence; and General Mustapha Hamdan, Commander of the
Republican Guard Brigade.
1678. The four have been interviewed by UNIIIC in
the presence of counsel. They each continue
to deny any involvement in the planning or execution of the assassination of
Hariri, any awareneAouareness
of such a conspiracy beforehand, and undertaking or ordering any actions
designed to obstruct the investigation afterwards.
1689. As in any investigation, the points of
departure for UNIIC have been the victim of the crime, the crime scene and
witnesses. In addition, the Commission
has focused on the following 5 sub-investigations.
1. Ahmad Abu
Adass
16970. UNIIIC’s investigation into the Abu
Adass lead focused on seeking to determine Mr. Abu Adass’s
whereabouts and evaluating the likelihood that Mr. Abu Adass
was actually the suicide bomber he was purported to be.
1701. UNIIIC was unable to interview Mr. Abu
Adass’s father, who had also been interviewed by the
Lebanese authorities on the 14 February 2005, because he died
on 7 March 2005 shortly after being called to appear before the Investigativeting
Judge.
1712. Mr. AdassAbu
Adass’s mother, Nehad Moussa, was interviewed by UNIIIC on 7 July
2005, and had previously been interviewed at least four times by Lebanese
authorities, the first time on the 14 February 2005. She and Adass Mr. Abu Adass’s’s
father Tayser Moussa were illegally detained
for approximately 10 days. She
stated that she told the Lebanese authorities the following: Adass Mr.
Abu Adass disappeared on 16 January 16,
2005 and was never not heard from of since. According to her, in early January 2005, Adass Mr.
Abu Adass explained to her that he had met an individual whom she
knew only as “Mohammed” who wanted to convert to Islam from Christianity and AdassMr. Abu
Adass was
helping him. Adass Mr.
Abu Adass reported that Mohammed appeared to be wealthy and he
would occasionally disappear for a period of a week or so. After one such disappearance, on the evening
of Saturday, 15 January 2005, Mohammed
called their home. Mohammed told Adass Mr.
Abu Adass that he would come to pick Adass Mr.
Abu Adass up the next morning, to show him a surprise. Adass Mr.
Abu Adass left with Mohammed that Sunday, 16 January 2005,
promising his mother he would be out only for a few hours, since she had
requested that he stay to help her clean a large carpet. Adass Mr.
Abu Adass never returned. On
Monday morning, Adass Mr. Abu Adass’s
mother received a call from an individual who told her not to worry about Ahmed
as he was in Tripoli where their car had broken down and they were just waiting
to have it fixed. Ms. Moussa understood
that this was the same individual called “Mohammed” whom she had spoken to on
the telephone two days earlier. She
asked to speak to her son, but was told that her son was waiting at a house
without a phone and the caller was in the car shop. The caller told Ms. Moussa that her son would be back in time to
help clean the carpet. At approximately
9 p.m. that same day, she received another call from the individual called
“Mohammed” who said they did not have an accident and did not break down. The caller went on to say that Adass Mr.
Abu Adass wanted to go to Iraq and would not be coming back. When Ms. Moussa expressed surprise and
stated that Adass Mr. Abu Adass
had never mentioned any such interest before, the caller said he would try to
get her Adass Mr. Abu Adass’s
phone number so she could try to change his mind. The caller hung up and never called back. The family filed an official missing
person’s report with the ISF on 19 January 2005.
1723. In a follow-up interview with UNIIIC, Ms.
Moussa added that Mr. Abu Adass’s best friend was a man
by the name of Ziad Ramadan whom he had met as a colleague at athe
same
computer company approximately two years earlier. She recalled that Ramadan
was sent shortly before her son disappeared nearly every day from his work to
Tripoli. The last contact
she had with Mr. Ramadan was whenthat
he called her several days after her son disappeared to ask if she had any news
from her son. In her interviews with
the Lebanese authorities, Ms. Moussa stated that,
she had confirmed that her son did not have a driver’s license and that there
was no internet connection infrom their
house.
1745. One individual whom neither UNIIIC nor the
Lebanese authorities wasere able to
interview so far was Khaled Midhat Taha, another religious associate of Adass Mr.
Abu Adass’s, who is of significant interest, based on the travel
records available for him and some unusual coincidences. Mr. Taha met Abu
Adass
Mr. Abu Adass when they were students
at the Arab University where they used to meet in the University’s mosque. According to travel records, Mr. Taha
departed from Beirut International Airport for the United Arab Emirates on 21
July 2003 and returned to Beirut on 17 October 2003. The next record for him is an entry into Lebanon coming from
Syria by land on 15 January 2005, the day before Mr. Abu Adass’s
disappearance. The next day, Mr. Taha
left Lebanon by land towards Syria. The
records do not show a departure from Lebanon prior to 15 January 2005, which
indicates that he entered Syria prior to that date illegally. Further investigation revealed that three of
Mr.
Taha’s e-mail addresses went through Damascus and the fourth went
through Lebanon itself while purporting to be in Turkey. These factors suggest
that he was in Syria but wanted to convince his parents that he was in Turkey . Moreover, the date of his final departure
for Syria from Lebanon --- 16 January 2005 --- is the same as the date of Mr. Abu
Adbass’s
disappearance, suggesting a possible link between Mr. Taha’s
trip to Lebanon and Adass Mr. Abu Adass’s
disappearance. Moreover, as the
Lebanese authorities noted in their report, he was never arrested for his
apparently illegal entry into Syria prior to 15 January 2005, even upon his return
to Syria on 16 January 2005, an uncommon occurrence, suggesting that his
departure and entry the following day were facilitated by someone. The Syrian authorities have recently been
approached by UNIIIC to provide the Commission with detailed information on
Khaled Taha, especially his travel records into and out of Syria.
1756. As noted above, in the course of their
investigation, the Lebanese interviewees included Mr. Abu
Adass’s friends and associates, former neighbors, acquaintances from the mosque,
colleagues from former jobs, and classmates.
A number of these individuals were re-interviewed by UNIIIC. None had ever heard of Al- Nasra
wal Jihad, the group that Adass Mr. Abu Adass
was purportedly a member of according to the suicide bomb video message. Many of them reported similar stories of
being taken by the ISF, handcuffed, blindfolded, and stripped, and detained for
a period of time while being questioned about Mr. Abu
Adass and his affiliations with Islamic groups; most reported that they shared
with their interrogators their view that Mr. Abu
Adass was a loner and introvert who did not have the intelligence to be capable
of committing such a crime
1767. In response to a request through the Lebanese
authorities, the Syrian government informed UNIIIC that their computer files
showed no indications that Mr. Abu Adass either entered or left
Syria. Iraqi authorities informed the
Lebanese authorities through the Iraqi embassy in Beirut that Mr. Abu
Adass had not obtained a visa to Iraq.
1778. UNIIIC also submitted a request for details of
any organization within Lebanon who may have had Mr. Abu
Adass under observation between September 2004 and January 2005. The files obtained in response to this
request confirmed that no department within Lebanon had Mr. Abu
Adass under any observation during the relevant time period.
1789. A number of sources, confidential and
otherwise, provided information to UNIIIC on the role and whereabouts of Mr. Abu
Adass. Although the information
provided has not been independently verified, significantly, none of this
source information supported the theory that he was a lone suicide bomber
acting for an Islamic fundamentalist group.
Indeed, all of the source information pointed to the likelihood of Mr. Abu
Adass being used by the Syrian and Lebanese authorities as a scapegoat for the
crime, rather than being the instigator of crime himself. For example, one witness claimed to have
seen Mr. Abu Adass in the hallway outside
of
Rustum
GhazaliGeneral Ghazali’s
office in December 2004 in Anjar.
Another witness claimed that Mr. Abu
Adass was currently held in prison in Syria and will be killed once this
investigation is over. According to
him, Mr. Abu Adass had no role in the
assassination except as a decoy, and the videotape was recorded at gunpoint
approximately 45 days before the assassination. He later stated that General Assef
Shawkat forced Mr. Abu Adass to record the tape
approximately 15 days before the assassination in Damascus. He also stated that the tape was given to
Al-Jazeera by a woman with the nickname “Um Alaa.” Another witness stated that the day after the assassination
Faysal Al-Rasheed insisted that the case had been solved and the perpetrator
was Abu Adass Mr. Abu Adass,
as a suicide bomb and that Abu Adass Mr. Abu Adass’s
body was still at the crime scene.
Zuhir Al-Saddik stated that in early February 2005, he had
seen Abu Adass Mr. Abu Adass
at the Zabadane training camp in Syria, and that his information was that Abu
Adass Mr. Abu Adass had initially planned
to commit the assassination but had changed his mind at the last minute. He said that Mr. Abu
AdassHe was subsequently killed by the
Syrians, and his body was placed ion
the vehicle containing the bomb, and thus was destroyed in the crime scene.
17980. To date, no DNA evidence has been
found on the crime scene that can be linked to Abu Adass Mr.
Abu Adass.
1801. Despite months of investigation by both UNIIIC
and the Lebanese authorities, Abu Adass Mr. Abu Adass
remains a mysterious figure. A few significant points can still be made,
however, in connection with the Abu Adass investigation.
1812. OFirst,
other than the videotape itself which definitely was of Abu
Adass Mr. Abu Adass, there is little else
supporting the idea that he perpetrated this assassination through a suicide
bomb. There is no evidence, other than
the claim on the video itself, of the existence of a group called the Nasra and
Jihad Group Of Greater Syria. There is
no information about such a group in any open sources prior to 14 February
2005, for example, and neither the Lebanese authorities nor Abu Adass Mr.
Abu Adass’s friends and acquaintances appear to have even heard of
the group prior to the day of the assassination. Nor have any of Lebanon’s neighboring countries’ security
authorities, which have been asked by UNIIIC to provide information on the
assassination, have any knowledge of this group. Moreover, Mr. AdassAbu
Adass’s disappearance on 16 January 2005 has not been explained in
a manner that is consistent with the notion that he would be a suicide bomber a
month later. Notably, none of the
individuals who knew him well considered it likely that he could commit such a
crime, in light of his nature and intelligence. Finally, although there is always the possibility that no trace
of DNA of a suicide bomber conducting a massive blast would be found, it is
noted that there is no evidence of Mr. Abu Adass’s
DNA at the crime scene or indeed any other evidence, such as witnesses, that he
was present at the crime scene at the time of the crime.
1823. However, one aspect of the investigation to
date is clear: much of the information surrounding Mr. AdassAbu
Adass and his disappearance points to Syria. Khaled Taha’s peculiar travel records,
indicating an entry into Lebanon from Syria the day before Mr. AdassAbu
Adass’s disappearance, as well as the attempt to obscure his
presence in Syria by seeking to show that his emails came from Turkey when they
in fact came from Syria, are indicative of the type of evidence pointing to
Syrian involvement in Adass’s Mr. Abu Adass’s fate
which cannot be discounted as mere coincidence. Moreover, the vague information available about “Mohammed”
indicates that he was likely Syrian, and the sudden return
to Syria of Mr. AdassAbu
Adass’s Syrian best friend, Ziad Ramadan, shortly after being
interviewed by the Lebanese authorities, all suggest shadowy Syrian connections to Abu
Adass Mr. Abu Adass’s disappearance. Finally, much of the source information relevant
to Mr.
Abu Adass’s fate points to Syria and Syrian officials, as well as
certain Lebanese officials. While it is
true that little of this source information has been independently
corroborated, it is significant that no information points to any other entity
as being involved in his disappearance or that he was a suicide bomber. Although this is not definitive, these
repeated connections to Syria bear further investigation.comment.
Conclusion:
There is no evidence that Abu
Adass Mr. Abu Adass belonged to the group al
nasra wal-jihad fee bilad Al-Sham as claimed in the Al-Jazeera videotape,
nor even that such a group has ever existed or does exist now. There are no indications (other than the
videotape) that he drove a truck containing the bomb that killed Hariri. The evidence does show that it is likely
that Mr. Abu Adass left his home on 16
January 2005 and was taken, voluntarily or not, to Syria, where he has since
disappeared.
2. Telephone Analysis
1834. One of the most important aspects of this
investigation has been the analysis of telephones. A specialized software was used to analyze and investigate
numerous telephone calls by those figures identified as the most important to
the investigation, permitting UNIIIC to achieve an optimal result with limited
staff members and a short timeframe.
The assistance of the Lebanese telephone companies and authorities was
essential to making the analysis effective.
For example, the Lebanese telecommunications companies MTC Touch and
Alpha responded quickly to requests for cellphone subscriber information and
toll records. Similar information on
landlines was provided to the Commission through the Ministry of Telecommunications. This prompt assistance was invaluable as it
permitted investigators to quickly analyze specific telephone calls of
subscribers and to establish patterns of communication between particular
groups of subscribers. In total, the
Commission requested information on approximately 2,235 subscribers and
obtained telephone connection data for approximately 70,195 telephone
calls. The telephone analysis, which
has already been critical in establishing leads and determining connections
between the key figures, will continue to be a central aspect of this
investigation as it evolves.
1845. According to Ghassan Ben Jeddou, the director
of Al-Jazeera, Al-Jazeera received four calls on the afternoon of 14 February
prior to airing the Abu Adass videotape.
The records revealed only three calls to Al-Jazeera that afternoon,
however, at 1411 hrs, 1527 hrs and 1704 hrs.
1856. It has not been possible to identify the time
or origin of the reported fourth call to Al-Jazeera.
1867. Leila Bassam of Reuters reported that
Reuters they received one telephone call on 14 February regarding Abu
Adass Mr. Abu Adass’s claim of
responsibility for the bombing, which records show occurred at 1411 hrs.
1878. Telephone records reveal that the same prepaid
card was used to contact Al-Jazeera and Reuters for all of the above telephone
calls. It was purchased in Beirut,
Najaar, on 10 February 2005. The calls to Al-Jazeera and Reuters were made from
four different telephone booths, all located in Beirut and one of which is near
the ESCWA Center in downtown Beirut, approximately two kilometers from the
crime scene. This prepaid card was only used to dial Al-Jazeera and Reuters and
there is no record that it was used to make any other telephone call.
18889. The videotape of Abu Adass Mr.
Abu Adass confessing to the crime was placed in a tree in front of
the ESCWA building in downtown Beirut.
UNIIIC obtained and viewed the CCTV tapes from ESCWA for the 14 February
2005 in order to seek to identify any individuals or vehicles that could have
been connected to the drop-off of that videotape and the subsequent calls to
Al-Jazeera. After viewing these images,
however, it was determined that it was not possible to clearly identify any
vehicles or individuals approaching the tree in front of ESCWA from the
video. UNIIIC investigators also
interviewed security guards from Protectron Security, which is responsible for
providing security for the parking lots situated next to the ESCWA and
Al-Jazeera buildings in downtown Beirut.
However, none of the security guards interviewed on duty that day
witnessed any unusual activity related to placing an item in the tree in front
of ESCWA.
Conclusion:
It has not been possible yet to identify the individual or individuals
responsible for telephoning Al-Jazeera and Reuters on 14 February or the
individual or individuals responsible for the videotape of Abu Adass Mr.
Abu Adass.
3. Use of pre-paid telephone cards
18990. Investigative Judge Elias Eid
obtained records for and reviewed all of the phone calls on 14 February 2005 to
Al-Jazeera. Judge Eid noted one mobile
phone call to Al-Jazeera as particularly significant: a call made to Al-Jazeera
on a prepaid card at 2207 hrs on 14 February 2005. This same prepaid card received a telephone call one minute after
the blast, at 1257 hrs, from a telephone booth located in Tripoli near a
building housing Syrian Intelligence Services.
On 30 January a call was made to the landline at the home of Abu
Adass Mr. Abu Adass’s home from
that same Tripoli phone booth.
1901. UNIIIC obtained and reviewed the call records
for prepaid card number 03925152 based on this information from Judge Eid. UNIIIC’s investigation has revealed so far
that while there is no identified subscriber, the card bears significant
connections. On 8 February 2005, for example, that prepaid card had a
contact with a mobile telephone number belonging to Tarek Ismat
Fakhreddin. Mr. Fakhreddin, a prominent
businessman, is a close associate of then-Prime Minister Omar Karame. Tarek Fakhreddin also made calls hours after
the blast to Mustafa General Hamdan,
Raymond General Azar,
Ali
General Hajj
and the Syrian Syrian intelligence
officer Jamea Jamea. In
addition, he had telephone contact with his nephew Raed Fakhreddin at 1337 hrs
on the 14 February 2005. Raed Fakhreddin is heavily suspected to have
bought the prepaid cards which were used to organize the assassination. The prepaid card also had contacts with
another telephone number which was in contact with Raed Fakhreddin’s mobile
phone in December 2004, and January, February and March 2005.
1912. This pre-paid card has also been connected to
a number of prominent Lebanese and Syrian officials. For example, the card was in contact with three different numbers
which in turn were in contact with Mustafa Hamdan’s mobile phone in January,
March, and July 2005. Two days before
the explosion, on 12 February 2005, this pre-paid card was also in contact with
a mobile phone number belonging to ex-Minister Abel Rahim Yussef Murad. Mr. Murad’s mobile phone in turn called Ali
Hajj after the blast. TInterestingly,
the mobile phones of Mr. Murad and Tarek Isamt Fakhreddin were in
contact with each other on 17 January 2005, one day after Ahmad Abu Adass’s
disappearance. This prepaid card also had contacts with a
telephone number which in turn was in regular contact with the mobile phone
number belonging to the politician Nasser Kandil, and the card had contacts
with two mobile phone numbers in February and March 2005 which in turn were in
contact on 14 and 17 February 2005 with the mobile phone number used by Syrian
intelligence officer Jamea Jamea.
1923. The prepaid card had contacts with a telephone
number on 5 January 2005 which was in contact on 26 January 2005 with the
telephone number of Younis Abdel-Al, of Al-Ahbash, the brother of the
above-mentioned Ahmed Abdel-Al. The
prepaid card was also in contact with a different telephone number on 5 January
which was in contact twice on 10 January 2005 to a telephone number belonging
to Walid Abdel-Al, a brother of Younis and Ahmed Abdel-Al and a member of
Mustafa Hamdan’s Republican Guard Brigade.
Conclusion:
The user or users of this pre-paid card on 14
February 2005 is significant and identification of that individual or
individuals , if possible, is
a priority for this investigation.
4. Australian
Investigation
1934. In an interview with UNIIIC, Adnan Addoum,
Minister of Justice at the time of the bombing, stated that it was his belief
that UNIIIC investigators should pursue this investigation and question the six
Australian suspects as to their purpose of traveling. He also indicated his belief that in light of the fact that the
vehicle allegedly used in the bombing was a right-hand drive vehicle (as used
in Australia), further suspicion should be cast on those six suspects. He added that it was his belief that “due to
media and religious pressures, the investigation judge did not give this matter
enough importance.”
1945. UNIIIC investigators thoroughly reviewed the
results of the Lebanese and Australian investigation into these six suspects
and, as set forth below, have concluded that there is no basis for believing
that they had any involvement in the assassination of Hariri. In pursuing this review, UNIIIC investigators
also were Aouareaware that
there were six sim cards used in connection with the assassination, and that
usage on the sim cards terminated at the time of the explosion. Noting that there were six suspicious
Australians, and six suspicious sim cards, an unusual coincidence, UNIIIC
believed that a review of the Australian and Lebanese investigations into this
area would be prudent
1956. Having closely examined the file, UNIIIC can
highlight the following points:
§ The Lebanese
authorities reported and requested assistance from Interpol to locate and
interview the identified suspects in accordance with established protocol.
§ The protocol
followed by Interpol was correct.
§ The
Australian authorities were contacted via Interpol to follow up on this matter.
§ The
Australian authorities carried out a thorough investigation into the matter and
presented a report on their findings to the Lebanese authorities.
§ The Lebanese
authorities properly suspended this present line of inquiry based on the report
presented by the Australian authorities.
Conclusion:
Based on the above,
the investigation carried out by the Australian authorities and the findings
obtained should be considered as conclusive.
Mr. Addoum’s suspicions are unfounded and there is no evidence to support
them. His basis for voicing
them is unclear. The
pursuit of this line of investigation distracted the Lebanese authorities from
following other lines of investigation.
5. Ahmad Abdel-Al
1967. Sheikhh Ahmad
Abdel-Al, a prominent figure in the Al-Ahbash, was responsible for the public relations and
military and intelligence for Al-Ahbash, the Association of Islamic
Philanthopic Projects, a Lebanese group with strong historical ties to the
Syrian authorities. Abdel-Al has proven
to be a significant figure in the light of his links to several aspects of this
investigation, especially through his mobile phone which had numerous contacts
with all the important figures in this investigation; indeed, it does not
appear that any other figure is as linked to all the various aspects of this
investigation as Abdel-Al.
1978. Abdel-Al was interviewed as a witness and
later as a suspect by UNIIIC. Some of
his actions, and some statements during his interview, suggest attempts to hide
information from the investigation. For
example, he tried to hide the origin of his mobile telephone number on giving
his prepaid card on 12 March 2005 to his Al-Ahbash friend Mohammed Halawani and
requesting that the card be registered in Halawani’s name. During UNIIIC’s interview with Halawani, it
took him several hours to admit that the telephone number in question was in
fact used by Ahmad Abdel-Al.
Additionally, according to Abdel-Al’s statement, on 14 February 2005, he
left home and went to the Al-Ahbash office.
His telephone records reveal that at 1147 hrs, he had a telephone
contact with a number which phoned his home telephone number a number of times
immediately before the explosion --- 1226 hrs, 1246 hrs and 1247 hrs. While Abdel-Al told UNIIIC that he called
home shortly after the explosion at 1256 hrs, telephone records show that the
call was made at 1254 hrs, two minutes before the explosion. Abdel-Al stated, that he did not leave the
Al-Ahbash office the day of the blast for security reasons. The telephone records showed four calls to
Syrian intelligence officer Jamea Jamea, at 1142 hrs, 1814 hrs, 2023 hrs and
2026 hrs. According to a witness,
Abdel-Al visited Jamea Jamea’s office the evening of the blast at 19:30 in
which the two discussed Abu
Adass Mr. Abu Adass. Moreover, shortly after his visit to Jamea
Jamea’s office, Abdel-Al’s mobile phone registered a call to Rustum GhazaliGeneral
Ghazali, at
1956 hrs. Abdel-Al also sought to steer
the investigation towards Abu Adass Mr. Abu Adass,
not only by providing the Lebanese authorities with extensive information on Mr. AdassAbu
Adass shortly after the blast, but also stating to UNIIIC that the
Al-Ahbash Security Service had seen Abu Adass Mr.
Abu Adass before the assassination in the Ain Al-Hilweh Palestinian camp together with
Abu Obeida the deputy leader of the terrorist group Asbat al Ansar.
198199. There are also numerous contacts
between Ahmad Abdel-Al and Lebanese State Security on the day of the blast. For
example, Abdel-Al had almost daily telephone contact with Brigadier General
Faysal Rasheed, Chief of State Security in Beirut and on 14 February 2005, they
had telephone contact at 1035 hrs, 2008 hrs, 2113 hrs, 214 hrs and 2216 hrs.
Ahmad Abdel-Al also had contact with suspect Raymond Azar, of the Lebanese
Army, on 14 February 2005, as well as 16 and 17 February 2005. There was a call between the mobile phone
of Albert Karam, another member of the Lebanese Army Intelligence, and Ahmad
Abdel-Al on 14 February as well, at 1212 hrs, about 44 minutes before the
blast.
199200. Abdel-Al’s phone also had extensive
telephone contacts with Mustafa Hamdan’s phone, as 97 calls occurred between
the two between January and April 2005.
Of these, four were made on 14 February 2005, after the explosion. Ahmad had two telephone contacts with his
brother, Walid Abdel-Al, a member of the Republican Guard, the day of the blast
at 16:15 and 17:29. In addition,
Abdel-Al received a call on 11 February 2005 at 2217 hrs from the same
telephone booth used to call Al-Jazeera shortly after the blast on the 14
February. He also received a call on
the 4 February 2005 at 19:34 and on 26 February 2005 at 0933 hrs from the booth
used to call Reuters shortly after the blast.
2001. Abdel-Al has been in frequent contact with
Mahmoud Abdel-Al, his brother, who is also active in Al-Ahbash. Mahmoud Abdel-Al’s telephone calls on 14
February are also interesting: he made a call minutes before the blast, at 1247
hrs, to the mobile phone of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and at 1249 hrs had
contact with Raymond Azar’s mobile telephone.
2012. Abdel-Al also has notable connections to a
significant weapons store discovered in southern Beirut in July 2005. This weapons store was raided by the ISF on
26 July 2005 and five people, with close connections to the former Mourabitoun
militia, were arrested. One of the arrestees was the driver and bodyguard of
Majed Hamdan, Mustafa Hamdan’s brother, who runs a firm which reportedly
provided security for the St. George hotelHotel. Abdel-Al reportedly arranged for another
arrestee to be employed as an electrician in the presidential palace. Furthermore, immediately after the arrests,
another individual fled and promptly telephoned Ahmad Abdel-Al.
Conclusion:
The evidence, including his links to other important figures,
especially Mustapha Hamdan and the Republican Guard, his telephone calls and
his involvement in the Lebanese investigation into Abu Adass Mr.
Abu Adass, make Ahmad Abdel-Al a key figure in any ongoing
investigation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
2023. It is the Commission’s view that the
assassination onf 14
February 2005 was carried out by a group with an extensive organization and
considerable resources and capabilities. The crime had been prepared over the
course of several months. For this purpose, the timing and location of Mr.
Rafik Hariri’s movements had been monitored and the itineraries of his convoy
recorded in detail.
2034. Building on the findings of the Commission and
Lebanese investigations to date and on the basis of the material and
documentary evidence collected, and the leads pursued until now, there is
converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this
terrorist act. It is a well known fact that Syrian Military Intelligence had a
pervasive presence in Lebanon at the least until the withdrawal of the Syrian
forces pursuant to resolution 1559. The former senior security officials of
Lebanon were their appointees. Given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions
and society by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services working in tandem,
it would be difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such a complex
assassination plot could have been carried out without their knowledge.
2045. It is also the Commission’s view that the
context of the assassination of Mr. Hariri was one of extreme political
polarization and tension. Accusations and counter accusations targeting mainly
Mr. Hariri over the period preceding his assassination corroborate the
Commission’s conclusion that the likely motive of the assassination was
political. However, since the crime was
not the work of individuals but rather of a sophisticated group, it very much seems
that fraud, corruption, and money-laundering possibly involving Bank
al-Madina could also have been motives for individuals to participate in the
operation.
2056. The Commission considers that the
investigation musthas to
continue for some time to come. In the short time period of four months more
than 400 persons have been interviewed, 60 000 documents reviewed, several
suspects identified, and some main leads established. Yet, the investigation is
not complete.
2067. It is the Commission’s conclusion that the
continuing investigation should be carried forward by the appropriate Lebanese
judicial and security authorities, who have proved during the investigation
that with international assistance and support, they can move ahead and at
times take the lead in an effective and professional manner. At the same time,
the Lebanese authorities should look into all the case’s ramifications
including bank transactions through Bank al-Madina.
The 14 February explosion needs to be assessed clearly against the sequence of
explosions which preceded and followed it, since there could be links between
some, if not all, of them.
2078. The Commission is therefore of the view that,
should the Lebanese authorities so wish it, a sustained effort on the part of the
international community to establish an assistance and cooperation platform
together with the Lebanese authorities in the field of security and justice is essential. This will considerably
boost the trust of the Lebanese people in their security system, while building
self-confidence in their capabilities.
2089. The recent decision to proceed with new senior security
appointments was hailed by all the Lebanese parties. It was an important step
towards improving the integrity and credibility of the security apparatus. However,
it took place after months of a security vacuum and extensive
sectarian-political debate. Much needs to be done to overcome sectarian
divisions, disentangle security from politics, and restructure the security
apparatus to avoid parallel lines of reporting and duplication and to enhance
accountability.
20910. It is the Commission’s conclusion
that, after having interviewed witnesses and suspects in the Syrian Arab
Republic and establishing that many leads point directly towards Syrian
security officials as being involved with the assassination, it is incumbent
upon Syria to clarify a considerable part of the unresolved questions. While
the Syrian authorities, after initial hesitation, have cooperated to a limitedcertain
degree with the Commission, several interviewees tried to mislead the
investigation by giving false or inaccurate statements. The letter addressed to
the Commission by the Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic proved to
contain false information. The full picture of the assassination can only be
reached through an extensive and credible investigation that would be conducted
in an open and transparent manner to the full satisfaction of international
scrutiny.
2101. As a result of the Commission’s investigation
to date, a number of people have been arrested and charged with conspiracy to
commit murder and related crimes in connection with the assassination of Mr.
Hariri and twenty-two others. The
Commission is of course of the view that all people, including those charged
with serious crimes should be considered innocent until proven guilty following
a fair trial.